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ABSTRACT
Criminal sanctions are a necessary and appropriate response to
crime. But extremism, especially when coupled with a slavish and
unthinking adherence to traditional practices, nearly always produces
unfortunate consequences. Such is the case with the rapid growth in
prison numbers in the United States over the past two decades. The
prime purpose of imprisonment is to punish serious offenders and to
prevent them from reoffending during the period of detention. The
overuse of imprisonment has resulted in the violation of the most
cardinal moral prohibition associated with imprisonment: punishing the
innocent. The runaway cost of the prison budget has resulted in the
community being needlessly punished to the tune of tens of billions of
dollars annually. This is money that cannot be spent on profoundly
important social services such as health and education. This Article offers a solution to this abhorrent public policy failing. We propose new
forms of punishment that are more cost efficient than jail and that
achieve all of the purported benefits of imprisonment: incapacitation and
deterrence. The proposed sanctions are in two main forms. The first
sanction is twenty-four-hour technological monitoring of every
movement by an offender. The second sanction targets educational and
employment pursuits of offenders in combination with disgorgement and
clawback remedies. It is suggested that one or both of these sanctions can
replace imprisonment as the sanction of choice for all current prisoners
except serious sexual and violent offenders. This would result in an
approximate halving of the number of offenders in United States prisons.
If this solution is not effective and United States political sentencing
realities compel the continuing addiction to imprisonment at the expense
of all alternatives, there is still a better way forward. The United States
should open up the housing of its prisoners to price based competition:
states and emerging economies should be allowed to compete to provide
prison accommodation in an efficient manner. We propose that this may
be undertaken subject to binding and enforceable commitments made by
these states to adhere to basic human rights standards and appropriate
levels of accommodation and amenities.
INTRODUCTION
The United States sentencing system has remained remarkably
resistant to change. Technological advances have resulted in profound
changes to every human endeavour. Standing stubbornly outside this
trend is the manner in which the criminal justice system deals with
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criminals. Confining criminals behind large walls remains the orthodox
method for punishing serious offenders, as it has since the British
colonization of the Americas more than 500 years ago. As former
Attorney General Eric Holder said, “too many Americans go to too many
prisons for far too long, and for no truly good law enforcement reason.
It’s clear, at a basic level, that 20th century criminal justice solutions are
not adequate to overcome our 21st century challenges.”1 Moreover,
imprisonment in the U.S. has stark implications for racial equality and
for innocent families. As an influential study by the National Research
Council noted “[i]n 2010, blacks were incarcerated at six times and
Hispanics at three times the rate for non-Hispanic whites,”2 and “the
number of children with an incarcerated father increased from about
350,000 to 2.1 million—about 3 percent of all U.S. children” in the two
decades between 1980 and 2000.3
The continued emphasis on imprisonment as the dominant method
of punishment represents an abject failure of intellect and a profound
social and political policy mistake. Technological advances provide more
efficient and humane techniques to achieve most of the appropriate and
attainable objectives of imprisonment. This error is compounded
dramatically by the unprecedented surge in the growth in imprisonment
numbers of the past two decades in the U.S. The increase in the use of
imprisonment in the U.S. is staggering by any measure. The U.S.
imprisons more of its citizens than any country on earth—and by a large
margin.4
Criminals elicit little, if any, community empathy, and hence in a
democracy it is not surprising that political and public policy reforms
that involve sterner punishments are developed and implemented in a
largely unabated manner. Theoretical concerns regarding the legitimacy
*

School of Law, Deakin University, Burwood, Victoria, 3125, Australia.
School of Law, Swinburne University, Hawthorn, 3122, Australia.
1. Eric Holder, Attorney General, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar
Association’s House of Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/
2013/ag-speech-130812.html [https://perma.cc/FJ7C-PT26]. He went on to note that “[w]hile the
entire U.S. population has increased by about a third since 1980, the federal prison population has
grown at an astonishing rate—by almost 800 percent. . . . [F]ederal prisons are operating at nearly 40
percent above capacity. Even though this country comprises just 5 percent of the world’s population,
we incarcerate almost a quarter of the world’s prisoners. More than 219,000 federal inmates are
currently behind bars. Almost half of them are serving time for drug-related crimes, and many have
substance use disorders. Nine to 10 million more people cycle through America’s local jails each
year. And roughly 40 percent of former federal prisoners—and more than 60 percent of former state
prisoners—are rearrested or have their supervision revoked within three years after their release.”
2. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 2 (2014) [hereinafter GROWTH OF INCARCERATION].
3. Id. at 260.
4. See infra Part V.
**
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or desirability of harsher sanctions have not curtailed the rise in
imprisonment numbers. Pragmatic considerations might be capable of
having a greater influence. The massive amount of public spending on
prisons is a significant incursion into the public revenue and a deviation
from cardinal community enhancing reforms, such as health and
education.
Moreover, the empirical evidence regarding the efficacy of
state-imposed sanctions to achieve established sentencing goals indicates
that most of them are unattainable.5 Punishment does not meaningfully
deter; it rarely reforms and often does not prevent offenders from
committing serious crime. In short, the obsession with imprisonment
rarely has a beneficial outcome and it comes at a striking cost to the
community. This is acknowledged by the 2014 National Research
Council Report, which concluded:
[An] increase in incarceration may have caused a decrease in crime,
but the magnitude of the reduction is highly uncertain and the
results of most studies suggest it was unlikely to have been
large. . . . The incremental deterrent effect of increases in lengthy
prison sentences is modest at best.6

The unthinking and unbridled use of imprisonment has led to a
lamentable irony. The strongest theoretical prohibition associated with
punishment is punishing the innocent—many jurists regard this as an
absolute limitation. Theoretical arguments have been utterly ineffective
at reducing prison numbers.7 This has resulted in a heavy fiscal burden
on the community, one that is arguably so weighty (and so lacking in
redeeming features) that the community is now unwittingly punishing
itself. This Article sets out reasons and mechanisms to cease this macro
self-inflicted harm.
We are not advocating for the closure of prisons. The key
advantage of jail is that it ensures that an offender does not offend during
his or her term of imprisonment. The second main benefit of
5. See infra Part IV.
6. GROWTH OF INCARCERATION, supra note 2, 4–5.
7. Scholars have argued for many years that massively increasing prison numbers is without
justification, yet as we have seen, the last few decades have seen incarceration levels reach record
highs. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 134 (1996); Albert W Alschuler,
Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure of the Federal Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85,
92–93 (2005); Richard Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth
Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571 (2005); Richard Frase,
Sentencing Principles in Theory and Practice, 22 CRIME & JUST. 363 (1997); Cassia Spohn,
Twentieth-Century Sentencing Reform Movement: Looking Backward, Moving Forward, 13
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 535, 536 (2014); Michael Tonry, Remodeling American Sentencing: A
Ten-Step Blueprint for Moving Past Mass Incarceration, 13 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 503
(2014); GROWTH OF INCARCERATION, supra note 2, at 116–17, 121–22.
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imprisonment is that it constitutes a considerable hardship. We do not
contend that any single sanction or combination of sanctions can or
should completely replace imprisonment as an instrument of criminal
punishment. Rather, we propose that certain cohorts of prisoners should
be subjected to new forms of sanctions. These cohorts fall into two main
groups. The first group would be comprised of offenders guilty of crimes
that are not sufficiently serious to warrant incarceration, as we argue that
the current sentencing regime is too harsh against certain forms of
offenders, namely nonsexual and nonviolent offenders. The second group
would be comprised of prisoners who have committed relatively serious
offences but do not present a strong risk of reoffending. This group
would consist mainly of first-time, mid-range sexual and violent
offenders. This entails that prisons be used mainly for recidivist sexual
and violent offences, unless one’s first offence is particularly serious. For
both groups, we advocate alternative sanctions including the greater use
of electronic monitoring and active Global Positioning Systems (GPS)
(sometimes coupled with Closed Circuit Television) surveillance. Other
dangerous violent and sexual criminals should be subjected to
incapacitation in conventional prisons. However, we argue that there
should be competition for locating these prisons based on price (and
subject to nonnegotiable standards of comfort, cleanliness, and range of
amenities)8 in order to achieve incapacitation in a cost-efficient manner.
Thus, we recommend fundamental and wide-ranging reform in the
manner in which we punish criminal offenders. The reforms will make
the criminal justice system fairer and more efficient and would result in
massive public expenditure savings by slashing tens of billions of dollars
from the annual cost of running prisons. They will also ensure that
community safety is not diminished and, in fact, if some of the savings
from the prisons’ budget are spent on providing a greater visible police
presence, the crime rate will almost certainly drop.
If it transpires that theoretical arguments cannot negate or soften the
“tough on crime agenda,” the only rational course is to make housing
prisoners as least damaging as possible to the community, while ensuring
a high baseline level of accommodation for prisoners. This entails that
we should consider outsourcing prisoners to other nations who can
provide the service far more economically without reducing the
conditions in which prisoners are housed.
We will first begin with an overview of the current use of
imprisonment as a criminal sanction. Part II then examines the
theoretical nature of punishment and provides the backdrop to Part III
8. See infra Part III.
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where we propose a number of new sanctions that will reduce the
reliance on imprisonment. We will also consider possible objections to
our proposal, in that it will undercut the efficacy of the criminal justice
system to achieve the objectives of incapacitation, deterrence, and
rehabilitation in Part IV. This is followed in Part V by a proposal to
situate jails in cheaper states within the U.S. or to outsource much of the
imprisonment program to developing countries.
I. THE CURRENT PICTURE OF IMPRISONMENT: NUMBERS, DOLLARS,
AND HARSHNESS
Imprisonment is the cornerstone of criminal punishment and the
harshest sanction in most developed countries, except the United States
and Japan, which still impose the death penalty in rare instances.
Imprisonment has one clear benefit: it is an effective means of depriving
offenders of their liberty9 and protecting the community from further
criminal acts during the period of incarceration.
The U.S. has embraced imprisonment with more enthusiasm than
any other nation on Earth. Presently, more than two million Americans
are in confinement,10 which equates to more than seven prisoners per one
thousand adults in the population.11 This rate has more than doubled over
the past two decades.12
Most developed countries have rates of imprisonment profoundly
lower than the U.S. It has recently been noted that:
U.S. incarceration is . . . striking when compared to incarceration in
other countries. In fact, the United States incarcerates over 20
percent of the world’s prisoners despite having less than 5 percent
of the world’s population. . . . [The] U.S. incarceration rate is over
four times the world average rate (Walmsley 2016). 13

9. For an account of the development and use of imprisonment as a criminal sanction, see
CHRISTOPHER HARDING & RICHARD W. IRELAND, PUNISHMENT: RHETORIC, RULE, AND PRACTICE
193–98 (1989).
10. LAUREN E. GLAZE & ERINN J. HERBERMAN, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
SER. NO. NCJ 243936, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2012, 3 (2013). The
exact number of prisoners is 2,228,400. Id.
11. See E. ANN CARSON & DANIELA GOLINELLI, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
SER. NO. NCJ 243920, PRISONERS IN 2012, TRENDS IN ADMISSIONS AND RELEASES 1991–2012,
(2013).
12. Albert Hunt, A Nation of Inmates, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/21/us/21iht-letter21.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
13. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES
ON INCARCERATION AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 23 (2016) [hereinafter ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVES].
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The dramatic relative overuse of imprisonment in the U.S. has
resulted in increasingly commonplace and loud calls for radical change.14
Vivien Stern, Secretary General of Penal Reform International, states,
“Among mainstream politicians and commentators in Western Europe, it
is a truism that the criminal justice system of the United States is an
inexplicable deformity.”15
The main drawback of imprisonment, from the community
perspective, is the cost. Costs have been creeping up gradually over the
past few decades, and it is only in recent years that the tipping point has
been such that several commentators have expressly noted that every
dollar spent on prisons is a dollar lost for spending on activities such as
health and education.16 This calculation is not new. What is new and has
compelled attention is the magnitude of the sums involved. In terms of
expenditure, it costs taxpayers in the U.S. on average $31,000 in direct
expenditures to house a prisoner for one year.17 The total spending on
prisons is now more than $80 billion annually.18 The scale of this, even
for the world’s largest economy, is considerable, especially when overall
the total expenditure on the U.S. criminal justice system is $270
billion—equating to $870 per capita.19

14. It is widely accepted that the United States has a “serious over-punishment” and “mass
incarceration” problem. See ANTHONY C. THOMPSON, RELEASING PRISONERS, REDEEMING
COMMUNITIES: RE-ENTRY, RACE, AND POLITICS (2009); Sharon Dolovich, Creating the Permanent
Prisoner, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICA’S NEW DEATH PENALTY? 96 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr.
& Austin Sarat, eds., 2012); Lynn Adelman, What the Sentencing Commission Ought to Be Doing:
Reducing Mass Incarceration, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 295 (2013); David Cole, Turning the Corner
on Mass Incarceration?, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 27 (2011); Bernard E. Harcourt, Keynote: The Crisis
and Criminal Justice, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 965 (2012); Andrew E. Taslitz, The Criminal Republic:
Democratic Breakdown as a Cause of Mass Incarceration, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 133 (2011); Anne
Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 423 (2013).
15. Vivien Stern, The International Impact of U.S. Policies, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 279, 280 (Meda Chesney-Lind & Marc
Mauer, eds., 2002).
16. See, e.g., Rebecca Klein, States Are Prioritizing Prisons over Education, Budgets Show,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 31, 2014, 2:29 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com.au/entry/statespending-prison-and-education_n_6072318.html?section=australia [https://perma.cc/Q3HN-TTJD];
Steven Hawkins, Education vs. Incarceration, AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 6, 2010),
http://prospect.org/article/education-vs-incarceration [https://perma.cc/CU38-TFR6].
17. According to a study by the Vera Justice Center, the average cost of a prisoner is
$31000/year. This is higher in some states and cities; for example, in NY State the average cost is
$60,000/year, and in NYC it is $168,000 per year. See Marc Santora, City’s Annual Cost Per Inmate
is $168,000, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/08/24/nyregion/citys-annual-cost-per-inmate-is-nearly-168000-study-says.html?_r=0.
18. Melissa Kearney & Benjamin Harris, Ten Economic Facts About Crime and Incarceration
in the United States, BROOKINGS 13 (May 1, 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/
research/reports/2014/05/10-crime-facts [https://perma.cc/JJ5M-PQBP]. This is $260 per capita.
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 13, at 5.
19. ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 13, at 5.
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California and ten other states spend more on prisons than higher
education.20 There is now an increasing recognition that something needs
to be done.21 Change is happening, but painstakingly slowly. In the past
few years, there has been a small drop in imprisonment numbers. From
2010 to 2012 there was a reduction of approximately three percent in
prison numbers. This was followed by a slight rise in 201322 and then
another slight drop in 2014; however, this was largely offset by an
increase in local jail numbers.23
In the federal jurisdiction, the Sentencing Reform and Corrections
Act of 2015 aims to implement a number of other measures that will
reduce prison numbers, including reduced sentences for certain offences,
such as drug offences. These changes would apply retroactively in some
cases.24 A number of Republican states, including Oklahoma25 and
20. Hansook Oh, California Budgets $1 Billion More to Prisons than to Higher Education and
Leaves Students Hanging, SUNDIAL (Sept. 19, 2012), http://sundial.csun.edu/2012/09/californiabudgets-1-billion-more-to-prisons-than-higher-education-and-leaves-students-hanging/
[https://perma.cc/RYK3-S7VX]; ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 13, at 44.
21. For example, in July 2015, President Barack Obama “called for lowering—if not ending—
mandatory minimum sentences for nonviolent drug offenses, restoring the voting rights of ex-felons,
revisiting hiring practices that require applicants to list criminal activity, and expanding job training
programs so inmates are better prepared to reintegrate into society.” Sabrina Siddiqui, ‘An Injustice
System’: Obama’s Prison Tour Latest in Late-Term Reform Agenda, GUARDIAN (July 16, 2015, 6:43
PM), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jul/16/barack-obama-prison-tour-criminal-justicerace-reform [https://perma.cc/3S3J-R4XB].
22. Press Release, Bureau of Just. Stat., US Prison Population Declined for Third Consecutive
Year During 2012, (July 25, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
press/p12acpr.cfm [https://perma.cc/G4GH-XKYC]. The decline only focused on prisoners
completing terms of one year of more in prisoners and fell from a high of 1,615,487 prisoners in
2009 to 1,571,013 in 2012. See id.
23. See Matthew Friedman, The U.S. Prison Population is Down (A Little), BRENNAN CENTER
FOR JUST. (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/us-prison-population-down-little
[https://perma.cc/XB75-XP28]. State and federal prison numbers decreased by 15,400 people from
December 31, 2013 to December 31, 2014. Id. However, county and city jail numbers increased by
13,384 inmates from midyear 2013 to midyear 2014. Id.
24. For a summary of the provisions, see Douglas A. Berman, Basic Elements of Sentencing
Reform and Corrections Act of 2015, SENT’G L. & POL’Y (Oct. 1, 2015, 10:33 AM),
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2015/10/basic-elements-of-sentencingreform-and-corrections-act-of-2015.html [https://perma.cc/94YQ-WGVP]; see also Editorial Board,
Toward Saner, More Effective Prison Sentences, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/04/opinion/sunday/toward-saner-more-effective-prisonsentences.html?_r=0 (lauding the Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2015). The bill was
introduced in the U.S. Senate on October 1, 2015, and approved by the U.S. Senate Judiciary
Committee on October 22, 2015. Changes were made to it on April 28, 2016. A similar bill has been
introduced into the House of Representatives. See Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2015,
S. 2123, 114th Cong. (2015).
25. Barbara Hoberock, Criminal Justice Reform Bills Signed into Law by Oklahoma Governor
(Apr. 28, 2016, 12:01 AM), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/capitol_report/criminal-justicereform-bills-signed-into-law-by-oklahoma-governor/article_842d52ae-4512-5311-899c665f31f2e90b.html [https://perma.cc/SQB4-MNU2].
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Texas,26 have introduced recent changes that reduce the severity of
mandatory sentences for nonviolent and nonsexual offences. These
changes are desirable, but they are piecemeal. This Article proposes
changes that will provide a more impactful and principled solution.
Before suggesting ways in which to accelerate the move away from
imprisonment, we will set out some of the less obvious disadvantages of
imprisonment.
This Article so far has focused on the cost of the imprisonment and
its ineffectiveness at achieving most of the objectives of punishment.
There is one other reason to curb the use of imprisonment: in many cases
the degree of punishment is too severe. Prison is not meant to be
pleasant. However, a closer look at the conditions that inmates endure
indicates that it is more traumatic than is intended or desirable. The most
direct and obvious negative impact of imprisonment is the deprivation of
liberty. In addition to this, there are other “pains” of imprisonment,
including deprivation of the following: access to goods and services;27
sexual relationships;28 and security.29
There are also long-term deprivations stemming from imprisonment
that transcend the period inmates spend behind bars. The negative
consequences of imprisonment include significantly reducing life
expectancy;30 vulnerabilities associated with financial matters; drug
temptations; decision-making and social interactions;31difficulty
experienced by former inmates in meeting their own basic needs,
including hunger, homelessness, and lack of access to health care;32
negative impacts on family members of prisoners, including higher rates

26. Ken Cuccinelli, Texas Shows How To Reduce Both Incarceration and Crime, NAT’L REV.
(May 18, 2016, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/418510/texas-shows-how-reduceboth-incarceration-and-crime-ken-cuccinelli [https://perma.cc/HB78-KN5G].
27. GRESHAM M. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES: A STUDY OF A MAXIMUM SECURITY
PRISON 67, 68 (2007).
28. Id. at 70, 71; see also ROBERT JOHNSON & HANS TOCH, INTRODUCTION TO THE PAINS OF
IMPRISONMENT (Robert Johnson & Hans Toch, eds., 1982).
29. Id. at 76, 77.
30. A study that examined the 15.5-year survival rate of 23,510 ex-prisoners in the U.S. State
of Georgia, found much higher mortality rates for ex-prisoners than for the rest of the population.
There were 2,650 deaths in total, which was a 43% higher mortality rate than normally expected
(799 more ex-prisoners died than expected). The main causes for the increased mortality rates were
homicide, transportation accidents, accidental poisoning (including drug overdoses), and suicide. See
Anne C. Spaulding, Prisoner Survival Inside and Outside of the Institution: Implications for
Health-Care Planning, 173 AM. J. EPIDEMIOL. 479, 482 (2011); see also GROWTH OF
INCARCERATION, supra note 2, at 220–26.
31. MICHAEL ROGUSKI & FLEUR CHAUVEL, THE EFFECTS OF IMPRISONMENT ON INMATES’
AND THEIR FAMILIES’ HEALTH AND WELLBEING 61 (2009). A limitation of this research is that it
had a small sample size—consisting only of 63 participants. Id. at 3.
32. Id.
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of divorce;33 homelessness;34 higher rates of depression, anxiety, and
antisocial behaviour among children of inmates;35 and difficulty in
securing employment and lower rate of life time earnings.36
It is pertinent to note that the prison experience does not necessarily
need to be so harsh. Prisons could be designed and managed in a manner
where the main deprivation is the denial of liberty and still achieve the
key objectives of punishing offenders and protecting the community.
Something close to this approach is endorsed in Scandinavia, where
imprisonment rates are considerably less than one person per one
thousand adults compared to the seven per one thousand adults in the
U.S., i.e., about 15% of the rate in the U.S.37 Additionally, and more
importantly for the purposes of this Article, when offenders are
sentenced to imprisonment in Scandinavian countries, they are treated far
more humanely than in the U.S. As noted by Matthew DeMichele from
the Penn State Justice Center for Research:
Scandinavian prisons operate under the philosophy of normalization
in which the punishment is the removal of liberty; that is,
incapacitation is the punishment (Pratt, 2008). The incarceration
experience should resemble normal life as closely as possible to
prepare the individual for release. In the United States, being
incarcerated is only one aspect of the punishment; the rough living
conditions and treatment of the inmate are another. . . . Numerous
differences exist between U.S. and Scandinavian criminal justice
systems: Recruitment, training, and health care are provided in the
community (not in the prisons); inmates have input in prison
policies; there is limited violence; and inmates are given individual
cells (Christie, 2000; Pratt, 2008). Essentially, then, many
Scandinavian inmates are working toward reentry after their
admission to prison, whereas in the United States, inmate reentry is
just beginning to gain serious traction.38

33. GROWTH OF INCARCERATION, supra note 2, at 2.
34. Id. at 267.
35. Id. at 270.
36. Id. at 247. One study estimated the earnings reduction to be as high as forty percent. Bruce
Western & Becky Pettit, Incarceration & Social Inequality, 139 DAEDALUS 13 (2010).
37. Peter Wagner & Alison Walsh, States of Incarceration: The Global Context 2016, PRISON
POL’Y
INITIATIVE
(June
16,
2016),
http://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/2016.html
[https://perma.cc/EQ39-DCS3].
38. Matthew DeMichele, Electronic Monitoring: It Is a Tool, Not a Silver Bullet, 13
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 393, 394–95 (2014).
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Moreover, conjugal relations are encouraged, and most prisons
provide accommodation where the partners and children of inmates can
stay without charge for weekends.39
The exemplar of the nonpunitive, integrative approach to
imprisonment is Halden Prison in Norway, which houses maximum
security prisoners. Each cell has unbarred windows and designer
furniture.40 Guards are not armed and prison conditions are maintained
with the assistance of questionnaires completed by inmates regarding
their experience in prison and what can be done to improve it.41 The
same approach applies in Finland. The Finnish Sentences Enforcement
Act of 2002 states: “punishment is a mere loss of liberty. The
enforcement of the sentence must be organised so that the sentence is the
only loss of liberty. Other restrictions can be used to the extent that the
security of custody and the prison order require.”42 The approach of
making the prison experience as close as possible to the outside
environment is achieving outstanding results, with recidivism levels of
prisoners after they are released as low as 20%.43 This compares to a
recidivism rate in the U.S. of approximately 50%.44
In theory, the U.S. could move towards less harsh prison
conditions. However, the reality is that any such change would take
decades to evolve. The current trend in the U.S. is towards increasingly
harsh prison conditions, which are consistent with the punitive approach
to criminal sentencing.45
The greatest single change to the prison landscape in the U.S. over
the past two decades, apart from the massive increase in the size of the
industry, has been the emergence and growth of “super-maximum
39. John Pratt & Anna Eriksson, CONTRASTS IN PUNISHMENT: AN EXPLANATION OF
ANGLOPHONE EXCESS AND NORDIC EXCEPTIONALISM 12 (2012).
40. Sonya Smith, Halden: A Luxury Norwegian Prison That’s Made to Rehabilitate Inmates,
SOULFULBEAUTY.COM (Oct. 5, 2015), http://soulfulbeauty.com/halden-a-luxury-norwegian-prisonthats-made-to-rehabilitate-inmates/ [https://perma.cc/EY7B-F7E3].
41. Sunanda Creagh, Nordic Prisons Less Crowded, Less Punitive, Better Staffed,
CONVERSATION (Mar. 18, 2013, 6:49 PM) http://theconversation.com/nordic-prisons-less-crowdedless-punitive-better-staffed-12885 [https://perma.cc/YQ9U-YN7R].
42. John Pratt, Scandinavian Exceptionalism in an Era of Penal Excess: Part 1, 8 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 119, 120 (2008).
43. Recidivism Studies, Norway, COUNCIL OF EUROPE (2010) http://wp.unil.ch/space/
publications/recidivism-studies [https://perma.cc/H8VK-7NGJ].
44. Kim S. Hunt & Robert Dumville, Recidivism Among Federal Offenders: A Comprehensive
Overview, U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION (Mar. 2016), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/
files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2016/recidivism_overview.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T4QR-TJJZ].
45. For observations regarding this theme, see Bettina Muenster & Jennifer Trone, “Why Is
America So Punitive?”, CRIME REP. (Mar. 24, 2016, 12:01 PM), http://www.thecrimereport.org/
news/articles/2016-03-why-is-america-so-punitive [https://perma.cc/VRP2-VXAE].
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[security]” or “super-max” prisons.46 These facilities normally consist of
“jails within prisons.”47 There is no uniformity to such conditions, but in
general they involve “incarcerating inmates under highly isolated
conditions with severely limited access to programs, exercise, staff or
other inmates.”48
One of the first super-maximum prisons was the “rock fortress,”
Alcatraz, in San Francisco Bay, which was operated by the U.S. Federal
Bureau of Prisons from 1934 until its closure in 1963.49 The number of
such facilities has grown rapidly since that time. More than forty U.S.
states now have super-maximum prisons.50 These prisons, or units within
prisons, house at least 25,000 prisoners.51
Unlike regular prison, there is no consistency regarding the exact
daily regimes of super-max prisoners, but it can include being locked in a
cell for up to 23 hours per day.52 When prisoners are out of their cells
they move to what is, in effect, no more than another (larger) cell where
they normally have contact with no more than one other prisoner.53
Inmates often do not have access to fresh air, direct sunlight, or
educational facilities, and have limited visiting rights and access to
communications facilities.54 In some circumstances, the regime is less
restrictive but it always involves being warehoused in a concrete room
and the time spent out of a cell is, in effect, spent in a slightly larger
concrete cell.

46. For a discussion of the operations in each of these countries, see THE GLOBALIZATION OF
(Jeffrey Ian Ross, ed., 2013).
47. CHASE RIVELAND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. NAT’L INST. OF CORRECTIONS, SUPERMAX
PRISONS: OVERVIEW AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 1(1999).
48. Id. They have also been defined as “a free-standing facility, or a distinct unit within a facility, that provides for the management and secure control of inmates who have been officially
designated as exhibiting violent or seriously disruptive behavior while incarcerated. . . . [T]heir
behavior can only be controlled by separation, restricted movement, and limited direct access to staff
and other inmates.” Roy D. King, The Rise and Rise of Supermax: An American Solution in Search
of a Problem?, 1 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 163, 170 (1999).
49. King, supra note 48, at 166.
50. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ENTOMBED: ISOLATION IN THE FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM 2
(July 2014).
51. Id.
52. See R v Benbrika & Ors [2008] 18 VR 410 (Austl.).
53. Liz Hobday, High-Security Prison ‘Driving Remand Prisoners Mad’, ABC ONLINE (Sept.
22, 2009, 9:19 PM), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2009-09-22/high-security-prison-driving-remandprisoners-mad/1437474 [https://perma.cc/G4BF-KFUS].
54. Michael Walton & Pauline Wright, Inquiry into Issues Relating to the Operations and
Management of the NSW Department of Corrective Services, NEW SOUTH WALES COUNCIL FOR
C.L.
(Jan.
30,
2006),
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/nswccl/pages/601/
attachments/original/1418076466/2006_submission_NSW_department_of_corrective_services.pdf?
1418076466 [https://perma.cc/6VCH-EMAZ].
THE SUPERMAX PRISON
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Super-maximum prisons are not only considerably more physically
onerous than normal prisons, but there is also significant evidence
establishing that they cause psychological damage to inmates. A
relatively recent report by Amnesty International notes,
There is a significant body of evidence that confining individuals in
isolated conditions, even for relatively short periods of time, can
cause serious psychological and sometimes physiological harm,
with symptoms including anxiety and depression, insomnia,
hypertension, extreme paranoia, perceptual distortions and
psychosis. This damaging effect can be immediate and increases the
longer the measure lasts and the more indeterminate it is. Isolation
has been found to have negative effects on individuals with no
pre-existing illness and to be particularly harmful in the case of
those who already suffer from mental illness.55

Thus, while the human rights concerns associated with prison
conditions in the U.S. are theoretically surmountable, pragmatically, it is
unlikely that prison conditions will improve in the foreseeable future. It
is clear that imprisonment has two key disadvantages: cost and
punitiveness. The rest of this Article attempts to find solutions in order to
ameliorate the extent of these problems.
II. DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK FOR DEVELOPING
NEW CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
A. Punishment: The Infliction of a Hardship
In order to advance (as opposed to merely change) the current
response to criminal behaviour, it is important to develop a doctrinal
framework for developing criminal sanctions. Logically, this commences
with an understanding of the nature and objectives of criminal sanctions.
At the most basal level, sentencing involves the imposition of
punishment. A number of definitions of punishment have been advanced.
Professor Andrew von Hirsch, Director of Centre for Penal Theory &
Penal Ethics, believes that “[p]unishing someone consists of doing
something painful or unpleasant to him, because he has purportedly
committed a wrong.”56 Professor C.L. Ten, from the National University
of Singapore, finds that “[p]unishment involves the infliction of some
unpleasantness on the offender, or it deprives the offender of something

55. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 50, at 31; see also Jesenia Pizarro & Vanja M. K.
Stenius, Supermax Prison: Their Rise, Current Practices and Effect on Inmates, 84 PRISON J. 248,
256 (2004).
56. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES 35 (1985).
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valued.”57 McTaggart, a former philosopher from Cambridge University,
defines punishment as “the infliction of pain on a person because he has
done wrong.”58 Other scholars, in defining punishment, have placed
more emphasis on the hurt that punishment seeks to bring about.
Most pointedly, punishment has been described as pain delivery.59
Nigel Walker, a former Professor of Criminology at Cambridge
University, is more expansive in his definition regarding the type of
treatment that can constitute punishment. According to him, punishment
involves “the infliction of something which is assumed to be unwelcome
to the recipient: the inconvenience of a disqualification, the hardship of
incarceration, the suffering of a flogging, exclusion from the country or
community, or in extreme cases death.”60
The common thread that emerges from these definitions is that
punishment is a hardship or deprivation, the taking away of something of
value for a wrong that has been committed. Thus, punishment necessarily
involves the infliction of some inconvenience or hardship on an offender.
The concept of hardship comes in degrees. Not all pain or hardship is
equivalent and the intensity can vary considerably. This is reflected in
the fact that most jurisdictions have a hierarchy of sanctions, which in
crude terms (in increasing severity) ranges from a fine to parole, with
imprisonment being the harshest disposition.61
It is on the basis of this first criterion that imprisonment is an ideal
sanction: we can be almost certain that it will inflict pain. “The loss of
freedom imposed upon a prisoner deprives him or her of a finite
resource, namely time. . . . Death is a certainty for everyone, and it can
therefore be argued that all prisoners must inevitably experience an
irreplaceable loss of time.”62
In order for criminal sanctions to hurt in each instance, they should
be designed to target the most widely coveted human interests. Due to
the diversity of human nature, there is no guarantee that any type of
criminal sanction will bite in every case; even prison does not harm all
people.63 For many people, prison deprives them of much that is
57. C. L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT AND PUNISHMENT 2 (1987).
58. JOHN MCTAGGART, STUDIES IN HEGELIAN COSMOLOGY 111 (1901).
59. NILS CHRISTIE, LIMITS TO PAIN 19, 48 (1981).
60. NIGEL WALKER, WHY PUNISH? 1 (1991).
61. As noted above, the obvious exception to imprisonment as the most severe sanction is the
death penalty.
62. Andrew Ashworth & Elaine Player, Sentencing, Equal Treatment and the Impact of
Sanctions, in FUNDAMENTALS OF SENTENCING THEORY 251, 259–60 (Andrew Ashworth & Martin
Wasik eds.) (1998).
63. For example, “a career criminal, Eric Cahill, on being released from jail after serving more
than 13 years for a series of rapes, embarked on a fragrant offending spree to get back in jail. On one
occasion he received a one-month term of imprisonment, and appealed, claiming that it was too
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meaningful in life—it cuts them off from their friends and family and
prevents them from pursuing projects that give their lives purpose and
enjoyment. For a small portion of offenders, however, prison is merely a
hiccup in a generally aimless life. Anomalies of this nature do not
prevent there being better and worse assessments concerning the
pervasiveness and depth of common human interests.
B. Punishment Should Also Be Efficient and
Not Violate Important Moral Limits
Apart from being effective in delivering pain, there are two other
important guiding principles that are relevant in formulating criminal
sanctions. First, criminal sanctions should be as economical as possible
to administer, monitor, and enforce. From the financial perspective, it is
important that the response to crime should not be more damaging than
the crime itself. It is self-defeating to develop and implement sanctions
that are prohibitively expensive. The absence of an accepted precise
methodology for ascribing a dollar amount to crime64 does not provide a
basis for excluding the imposition on public finances in assessing the
desirability of reforms to the criminal justice system.
The last criterion in developing criminal sanctions is that it is
important they do not violate cardinal moral proscriptions. There is, of
course, a considerable degree of uncertainty regarding the exact content
of moral principles.65 However, there are some basal norms that have
evolved. To this end, important moral prohibitions apply equally to
offenders as other members of the community. The manner in which
society treats offenders says as much about the standards of the community as it does about the criminals it is punishing: “a society that fails to
deal with cruelty will probably also need to develop mechanisms to
desensitize itself to suffering. In so doing, it will diminish itself.”66

lenient.” MIRKO BAGARIC, PUNISHMENT & SENTENCING, 217 (2001) (quoting S. Paxinos, Bizarre
Rapist Returns to Jail, THE AGE (Oct. 16, 1999)).
64. For a discussion of some approaches, see STEVEN RAPHAEL & MICHAEL A. STOLL, DO
PRISONS MAKE US SAFER? THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE PRISON BOOM (2009); Chris
Doucouliagos, et. al., Are Estimates of the Value of a Statistical Life Exaggerated?, 31 J. HEALTH
ECON. 197 (2012); ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 13.
65. Mirko Bagaric, A Utilitarian Argument: Laying The Foundation for A Coherent System of
Law, 10 OTAGO L. REV. 180 (2002) (N.Z.).
66. See John I. Kleinig, The Hardness of Hard Treatment, in FUNDAMENTALS OF SENTENCING
THEORY 283 (Andrew Ashworth and Martin Wasik eds.) (1998). Kleinig argues that even
imprisonment compromises the human regard to which offenders are entitled. Id. This comment is
made in the context of imprisonment, but applies even more so in the context of corporal
punishment.
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It follows that two potentially effective and efficient forms of
punishment are excluded. The first is corporal punishment.67 The
deliberate infliction of pain to the body should no longer be a form of
punishment. The abolition of corporal punishment has been instrumental
to the supposed “civilisation” of punishment.68 Inflicting a hardship on
members of an offender’s family could also constitute an efficient and
potentially effective means of punishment; however, this is intolerable
given the proscription against punishing the innocent.69 These moral
proscriptions are both likely to be reflected in the constitutional
prohibition against “cruel and unusual” punishment in the Eighth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, although the matters have not been
directly litigated.70
In light of the above exclusions, the starting point in developing
criminal sanctions is to identify which interests most people highly
value. The severity of a sanction can then be determined by evaluating
“how much [the] sanction intrudes upon the interests a person typically
needs to live a [happy] life.”71 It is clear that two highly coveted interests
are physical integrity and liberty—these interests are recognised in most
67. For an overview of the nature of corporal punishment, see CHRISTOPHER HARDING &
RICHARD W. IRELAND, PUNISHMENT: RHETORIC, RULE, AND PRACTICE 187, 193 (1989).
68. MICHEL FOCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 11 (1977). It has
been contended that this civilisation process is slowly being eroded with the employment of such
measures as curfews, boot camps, chain gangs, and three strike laws. See John Pratt, Towards the
“Decivilizing” of Punishment?, 7 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 487, 499–507 (1988).
69. H. J. MCCLOSKEY, META-ETHICS AND NORMATIVE ETHICS 180–81 (1969). A similar
example to McCloskey’s is provided in E. F. CARRITT, ETHICAL AND POLITICAL THINKING 65
(1947).
70. The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment has been applied sparingly in the
sentencing domain. To the extent that it has been applied in this area, it has been mainly in relation
to proscribing the death penalty to certain forms of crimes (non-homicide offences) and criminals
(juveniles). Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008). In determining the scope of this limitation
the U.S. Supreme Court has taken into account international standards relating to appropriate levels
of punishment. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002);
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). In relation to noncapital sentences, the Supreme
Court has endorsed the concept of proportionality as being a constraint on the level of punishment,
but the concept has not been developed with any degree of precision and can only be invoked to
prohibit sanctions that contain “gross disproportionality.” It has been observed that gross
disproportionality is a threshold requirement to the application of the proportionality principle, and if
this is satisfied, the Court will apply two further tests: “The second and third parts call for an
intrajurisdictional review of sentences received within the state for more and less serious crimes, and
an interjurisdictional review of sentences received in other states for the same crime.” Donna H. Lee,
Resuscitating Proportionality in Noncapital Criminal Sentencing, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 527, 529 (2008).
See also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 66 (2003). The
other key cases are: Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277
(1983); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). See also
John. F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,
97 VA. L. REV. 899 (2011).
71. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 60 (1993).
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moral codes.72 Other important interests can be identified by reference to
activities to which people commonly and frequently devote their time
and resources. It follows that other important interests are (not
necessarily in this order): (i) relationships with family and friends, (ii)
financial wealth, (iii) work, and (iv) education.
As noted above, it is inappropriate to target the family and friends
of offenders in imposing criminal sanctions. Prisons already target
liberty, while fines target the financial assets of offenders. We will now
argue that liberty should be curtailed in ways other than imprisonment
and that criminal sanctions should be developed that would limit the
work and educational pursuits of offenders.
III. NEW FORMS OF SANCTIONS
A. Opening the Prison Gates: Introducing the Criminal
Justice System to Technology
As noted above, the main benefit of prison is that it imposes an
almost total constraint on the liberty of the offender and hence ensures
that the offender cannot again damage the community by reoffending
during the term of imprisonment. The confinement and containment
process can now be effectively achieved by far less expensive means.
The key to this is the more effective and frequent use of
round-the-clock monitored electronic bracelets, which can be
supplemented by a global position system (GPS) and close-circuit
television (CCTV) surveillance. This is known as electronic monitoring
(EM).
Reports indicate that more than 100,000 people are under EM in
the U.S.73 EM, which originated in the U.S. in the early 1980s, is used in
a number of countries, including the United Kingdom.74 However,
problems have reduced the enthusiasm for electronic tagging in the

72. Bagaric, supra note 65, at 180.
73. Mike Nellis, Electronic Monitoring: Exploring the Commercial Dimension, 58 CRIM. JUST.
MATTERS 12 (2008); MATTHEW DEMICHELE & BRIAN K. PAYNE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE,
OFFENDER SUPERVISION WITH ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY: COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS RESOURCE
(2nd ed., 2009). For a summary of its introduction and use in the United States, see Lars H.
Andersen and Signe H. Andersen, Effect of Electronic Monitoring on Social Welfare Dependence,
13 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 349 (2014); see also Brian K. Payne, It’s a Small World, but I
Wouldn’t Want to Paint it: Learning from Denmark’s Experience with Electronic Monitoring, 13
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 381 (2014); DeMichele, supra note 38, at 393.
74. Mike Nellis, Surveillance and Confinement: Explaining and Understanding the Experience
of Electronically Monitored Curfews, 1 EUR. J. PROBATION 41, 41 (2009).
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United Kingdom. Some estimates put the number of offenders on some
form of electronic tagging in the U.K. at 180,000.75
The massive growth in use of EM is owed largely to the fact that it
offers significant economic advantages over jail because the device itself
costs far less than the cost of building a prison cell, and the ongoing
monitoring costs are lower than the operating costs of jail.76 The
potential for cost savings ranges from six to ten times when compared to
the alternatives. Therefore, when applied to hundreds of thousands of
offenders, the potential savings for the system could be in the billions of
dollars.
In the U.K., EM is primarily done via radio devices, and GPS is
used only for terrorism related offenders. In relation to GPS, the subject
is monitored 24/7 by satellites receiving transmitted information which is
then triangulated to provide data on location and movement. When the
subject enters a forbidden territory or leaves a geographic limit, the
surveillance officers and the offender are alerted via an alarm. If the
offender does not take corrective action, the authorities can order
intervention in order to bring him into conformity. The key advantage of
EM is its flexibility and adaptability to the profile of the individual
offender. For instance, the exclusion zones for child sex offenders would
include schools, playgrounds, and shopping malls, whereas a domestic
violence offender might only be excluded from the premises of his
spouse or other victim. Offenders under EM might also be required to
check in regularly with authorities.77
Some forms of EM are passive in the sense that a computer or other
device makes calls to the prisoner at random times to check in but
otherwise leaves him alone, whereas others are active and entail 24/7
monitoring of movement via satellite. Regardless of the form employed,
the objective of EM is to transfer confinement from a costly limited
space owned and managed by the state to one under the limited control
of the offender. It is widely used in pre-trial and post-release situations,

75. Rona Epstein, Electronic Monitoring of Offenders, 177(6) CRIM. L. & JUST. WKLY. (Feb. 9,
2013),
http://www.criminallawandjustice.co.uk/features/Electronic-Monitoring-Offenders
[https://perma.cc/EHK5-77FA].
76. A review in 2006 of the electronic monitoring of offenders found that the cost is about
one-fifth that of imprisonment and ‘robust’ in detecting violations of the term of the order. See U.K.
National Audit Office, The Electronic Monitoring of Adult Offenders (Feb. 1, 2006),
https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2006/02/0506800.pdf [https://perma.cc/UD3S-8PN8];
see also Natasha Alladina, The Use of Electronic Monitoring in the Alaska Criminal Justice System:
A Practical Yet Incomplete Alternative to Incarceration, 28 ALASKA L. REV. 125, 144 (2011).
77. Location Monitoring/Home Confinement (Tether Program), PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCY E.
DIST. OF MICH., http://www.miept.uscourts.gov/index.cfm?pagefunction=serLocationMonitor
[https://perma.cc/9VDH-MLL2].
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and we advocate for its greater use for nonviolent and nonsexual
offenders in lieu of custodial sentences.
Similarly, GPS tracking has received increasing attention in recent
years particularly in light of highly publicised sexual offences involving
children. One important advancement is the adoption of Jessica’s Law in
many states in the U.S. The law is named after Jessica Lunsford, a
nine-year-old Floridian child who was raped and murdered by a
neighbour with a record of crimes against children who lived across from
her house. A recent survey showed that thirty-nine states have adopted
some version of the law requiring GPS or EM of sex offenders.78 Thus, it
is clear that EM is very much a tool in the modern correctional landscape
for certain kinds of offenders.
In relation to offences which are relatively serious but do not
necessarily require a prison term (for example, low level violent
offences), the offender could be restricted to a relatively small area (for
example his or her home and outside yard area), and EM could be
coupled with around-the-clock CCTV surveillance.79 This would not
only provide a surer basis for knowing the whereabouts of the offender at
every point in time, but would also constitute a harsher form of
punishment given the incursion into personal privacy.
Studies indicate that active electronic monitoring supplemented by
GPS technology reduces recidivism.80 For example, a study of recidivism
rates of Argentinian offenders comparing those who had been jailed
versus those who had been tagged with EM showed that the former’s
recidivism rate was 22% compared to 13% for the latter.81 An important
study of 516 sex offenders in California showed that parole revocation
and recidivism were 38% higher for those on traditional parole when
compared with those under GPS monitoring.82 Notably, the study only
78. NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, SUMMARY OF STATE STATUTES
RELATED
TO
JESSICA’S
LAW,
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/WorkGroups/sexoffenders/
NCSLs_Jessicas_Law_Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/HFH8-MRQG].
79. In order for this sanction to be imposed, it would be necessary to obtain the informed
consent of other people who were to live with the offender.
80. U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., ELECTRONIC MONITORING REDUCES RECIDIVISM, NCJ 234460, 2
(Sept. 2011), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/234460.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6QX-75KW]; see
also Fredrik Marklund and Stina Holmberg, Effects of Early Release From Prison Using Electronic
Tagging in Sweden, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 41 (2009).
81. Rafael Di Tella & Ernesto Schargrodsky, Criminal Recidivism After Prison and Electronic
Monitoring, 121 J. POL. ECON. 54 (2013); see also William Bales, et al., A Quantitative and
Qualitative Assessment of Electronic Monitoring, FLA. ST. UNIV. COLL. OF CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM.
JUST. CTR. FOR CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y RES. (Jan. 2010), https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/grants/230530.pdf [https://perma.cc/32BG-AZHS].
82. Stephen V. Gies, et al., Monitoring High-Risk Sex Offenders with GPS Technology: An
Evaluation of California’s Supervision Program, REP. FOR NAT’L INST. OF JUST. vii (Mar. 31, 2012),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/238481.pdf [https://perma.cc/4JHR-FYXE].
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covered high-risk sex offenders on parole and found that GPS monitoring
was actually more expensive in these circumstances than traditional
parole supervision.83 Another study of high-risk gang offenders
monitored by GPS in California conducted over a two year period found
that the number of arrests both for general offences and violent offences
were lower for those under GPS monitoring.84 However, these offenders
were more likely to be in violation of their parole both in technical and
nontechnical terms. Moreover, GPS monitoring costs $21.20/parolee/day
whereas the traditional method (in the form of regular meetings with a
parole officer) only costs $7.20/parolee/day.85
Another study to have undertaken cost–benefit analyses of EM
programs was conducted by the District of Columbia Crime Policy
Institute. Investigators conducted a review of prior research comparing
EM to probation and found that EM results in a reduction in the average
number of arrests per participant, yielding a societal benefit of $3,800
per participant.86 The study estimated a net social benefit of between
$4,600 and $4,800 per person for EM programs serving 800 people.87
Our proposal for increased deployment of EM (especially when
accompanied by CCTV monitoring) as a sanction in lieu of jail will
encounter objections. First, attaching an EM device and subjecting an
offender to constant surveillance entails an infringement of privacy. This
type of objection is likely to be advanced in conjunction with familiar
critiques about the expansion of the surveillance state. However, the
criticism is without substance in this context because offenders have little
or no privacy in prison. Surveillance is constant and prison conditions
mean that the offender is likely to be sharing space at all times with other
inmates or guards who have the ability to observe him. Therefore,
electronic surveillance does not represent an invasion of privacy beyond
what is already accepted in the alternative of imprisonment. Moreover,
privacy is a dynamic concept that is constantly evolving, and the
expectations of privacy held by prisoners is conditioned by their
experiences of the alternatives, meaning that as these devices become
more common, the idea of less privacy becomes less objectionable.88
83. Id. at xvii. The report found the daily cost of GPS monitoring to be $35.96/day/parolee,
whereas the alternative was $27.45, which was a significant difference.
84. STEPHEN V. GIES, ET AL., MONITORING HIGH-RISK GANG OFFENDERS WITH GPS
TECHNOLOGY: AN EVALUATION OF THE CALIFORNIA SUPERVISION PROGRAM FINAL REPORT, REP.
FOR NAT’L INST. OF JUST. (Sept. 30 2013), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/244164.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7Q95-JBV4].
85. Id. at vii.
86. John K. Roman, et. al., The Costs and Benefits of Electronic Monitoring for Washington
D.C., D.C. CRIME POL’Y INST. 3 (2012).
87. Id.
88. See also United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 120 (2001).
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Besides, the state has a strong legitimate interest in monitoring
individuals deemed dangerous to society and a legal challenge is unlikely
to be successful.89
Second, increased deployment of EM might be attacked as a
violation of the ex post facto clause of the Constitution.90 As Justice
Chase wrote in Calder v. Bull,
The prohibition against their making any ex post facto laws was
introduced for greater caution, and very probably arose from the
knowledge, that the Parliament of Great Britain claimed and
exercised a power to pass such laws. . . . [In some] cases, they
inflicted greater punishment, than the law annexed to the offence.
The ground for the exercise of such legislative power was this, that
the safety of the kingdom depended on the death, or other
punishment, of the offender: as if traitors, when discovered, could
be so formidable, or the government so insecure! With very few
exceptions, the advocates of such laws were stimulated by ambition,
or personal resentment, and vindictive malice.91

Justice Chase sought to define what constituted an ex post facto law
and ruled that “[e]very law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a
greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when
committed”92 fell into that category.
To that end, the Supreme Court laid down a test to determine when
a sanction is to be regarded as punitive in Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez.93 The apex tribunal ruled that courts have to consider
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether
it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its
operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—
retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies
is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may
rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned[.]94

Under this standard, it is clear that GPS devices are not an
affirmative disability or restraint because it merely involves a small tag
attached to the body of a person. Also, the attachment of a device has not
been historically regarded as a punishment not just because it is a new
89. People v. Adams, 115 Cal. App. 4th 243, 258 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
91. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 389 (1798) (emphasis added).
92. Id.
93. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963).
94. Id.
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technology, but also because its relative inconspicuousness does not
subject the offender to stigma.95 Further, to the extent that the GPS
monitoring continues to subject the offender to disability or restraint, as
recognized by the Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe, a case concerning sex
offender registration requirements, “these consequences flow not from
the Act’s registration and dissemination provisions, but from the fact of
conviction, already a matter of public record.”96 Additionally, the
employment of GPS tracking protects both the community and the
individual, and the behavior it is seeking to protect against is a crime.
Moreover, aside from deterrence, the alternative justifications—
protection of the offender from further harm and public safety—are
reasonable based on the evidence of recidivism, which has been
recognized as an acceptable regulatory objective.97 Finally, GPS
monitoring is not excessive when weighed against the alternative,
namely imprisonment.98
The third objection that is likely to be addressed is that the
technology is not foolproof and offenders might be able to remove or
disable the device. Some studies have shown that the devices
malfunctioned or did not transmit signals in inclement weather.99
Moreover, some geographic locations might impose limitations on the
technical abilities of the devices. Nonetheless, technology continues to
improve and despite its limitations the competing alternative—
imprisonment—also has serious deficiencies.
There are a number of issues that have been raised, some of which
have resulted in a decline in the recent use of EM. Lars Andersen and
Signe Andersen summarise key problems as follows:
First, the money saved on imprisonment thanks to the use of
electronic monitoring was now spent on testing and supervising the
electronically monitored people (e.g., alcohol tests). Second,
electronic monitoring and other noncustodial alternatives to
imprisonment tended to widen the punitive system by putting more
people under the purview of the criminal justice system. Third, the
more intensive testing and supervision increased detection rates for
recidivism and technical violations, which in turn sent even more
95. Michael T. Charles, Research Notes: Juveniles on Electronic Monitoring, 5 J. CONTEMP.
CRIM. JUST. ONLINE 167 (1989).
96. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 101 (2003).
97. Id. at 87.
98. The “pains” of EM have been noted as follows: “monitored offenders reported that they
were deprived of goods and services; lost certain rights as a result of the monitoring; lost their
autonomy; and were, at least in some ways, deprived of their traditional heterosexual relationships.”
Payne, supra note 73, at 384–85.
99. Andersen, supra note 73.
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people into custody. This led some policy makers to view electronic
monitoring and other noncustodial alternatives to imprisonment as
failed social experiments, and the popularity of these programs
faded in the United States.100

These potential problems can be easily circumvented in the context
of our proposal. There is imperative to spend considerable resources
testing prisoners for drug and alcohol use. The criticism that
implementing monitoring sanctions more frequently will result in the
criminal justice system becoming more punitive is without merit. Critics
may claim that EM would result in the placing of more people under the
purview of the criminal justice system. However, this can be debunked
by ensuring that the sanction is only imposed in circumstances where the
offender would otherwise have been sentenced to imprisonment. Further,
EM orders should not necessarily result in more testing and thus frequent
imprisonment as a result of breaches resulting from testing, which often
has no productive basis.
Despite the advantages of EM devices (with or without CCTV), it is
not contended that its use and implementation should result in the
emptying of prisons. While EM can restrain the activities of all prisoners,
some offences are too serious for any sanction other than imprisonment.
Any new sanctions must give deference to fundamental aspects of
sentencing. And to this end, a foundational requirement is the
proportionality principle, which, in its crudest form, is the view that “the
punishment should fit the crime.”101
The proportionality principle is more fully set out by the High
Court in Australia in Hoare v The Queen.102 The Court found that “a
basic principle of sentencing law is that a sentence of imprisonment
imposed by a court should never exceed that which can be justified as
appropriate or proportionate to the gravity of the crime considered in the
light of its objective circumstances.”103 Proportionality is a requirement
of the sentencing regimes of ten states in the U.S.104 The precise

100. Id. at 351 (citing Joan Petersilia, Beyond the Prison Bubble, 75 FED. PROBATION 1, 1–4
(2011)).
101. Richard S. Frase, Theories of Proportionality and Desert, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS (2012).
102. 167 CLR 348, 354 (1989) (Austl.).
103. Id.
104. This is discussed in Gregory Schneider, Sentencing Proportionality in the States, 54
ARIZ . L. R EV . 241–42 (2012). The article focused on the operation of the principle in Illinois,
Oregon, Washington, and West Virginia. See also E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & RICHARD S. FRASE,
PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN LAW: CONTROLLING EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT
ACTIONS (Oxford University Press 2009) [hereinafter PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES].
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considerations that inform the proportionality principle vary in those
jurisdictions, but generally there are six relevant criteria:
1. Whether the penalty shocks a reasonable sense of decency;
2. The gravity of the crime;
3. The prior criminal history of the offender;
4. The legislative objective relating to the sanction;
5. A comparison of the sanction imposed on the accused with the
penalty that would be imposed in other jurisdictions; and
6. A comparison of the sanction with other penalties for similar
and related offences in the same jurisdiction.105
In addition to this, a survey of state sentencing law by E. Thomas
Sullivan and Richard S. Frase shows that at least nine U.S. states have
constitutional provisions relating to the prohibition of excessive penalties
or treatment106 and twenty‐two states have constitutional clauses that
prohibit cruel and unusual penalties, including eight states with a
proportionate‐penalty clause.107
Broken down to its core features, logically, proportionality has two
limbs. The first is the seriousness of the crime and the second is the
harshness of the sanction. Further, the principle has a quantitative
component—the two limbs must be matched. In order for the principle to
be satisfied, the seriousness of the crime must be equal to the harshness
of the penalty.
Some commentators have argued that proportionality is so vague as
to be meaningless, in light of the fact that there is no stable and clear
manner in which the punishment can be matched to the crime. Jesper
Ryberg notes that one of the key, most damaging criticisms of
proportionality is that it “presupposes something which is not there,
namely, some objective measure of appropriateness between crime and
punishment.”108 The most obscure and unsatisfactory aspect of
proportionality is that there is no stable and clear manner in which the
punishment can be matched to the crime. Ryberg further notes that to
give content to the theory, it is necessary to rank crimes, rank
punishments, and anchor the scales.109
105. Schneider, supra note 104, at 250.
106. PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES, supra note 104, at 155–56.
107. Id.
108. JESPER RYBERG, THE ETHICS OF PROPORTIONATE PUNISHMENT: A CRITICAL
INVESTIGATION 184 (2004).
109. Id. at 185. Even retributivists have been unable to invoke the proportionality principle in a
manner that provides firm guidance regarding appropriate sentencing ranges. See, e.g., ANDREW
VON HIRSCH & A. ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING 122 (2005).
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There is some merit in Ryberg’s critique. And as noted by Ian
Leader-Elliott and George Fletcher, the application of the proportionality
principle is especially difficult in the case of offences, such as drug
offences, where there is no direct, clear, and observable harm caused by
the crime:
The ruling principle of proportionality applies to offenders who
traffic in drugs no less than it does to offenders who inflict injury or
death. In the trafficking offences, however, there is not the same
intuitive, retributive ground for determining a punishment to fit the
offence. There is no natural measure of proportionality in offences
that are supposed to secure the common good. The American
theorist George Fletcher makes the point in his discussion of crimes
of lese majeste:
Just punishment requires a sense of proportion, which in
turn requires sensitivity to the injury inflicted. . . . The
more the victim suffers, the more pain should be inflicted
on the criminal. In the context of betrayal, the gears of this
basic principle of justice, the lex talionis, fail to engage the
problem. The theory of punishment does not mesh with the
crime when there is no tangible harm, no friction against
the physical welfare of the victim.110

While doctrinally it has been argued that there is a manner in which
firmer content could be accorded to the proportionality doctrine,111 an
exact matching of offence severity and penalty harshness is not feasible
in light of the current understanding of proportionalism.
However, this is not an issue that needs to be settled and resolved
for the purposes of this Article. Irrespective of the precise manner in
which harmfulness is assessed, it is clear that a cardinal criterion is the
extent to which it sets back the interests and welfare of victims.
Accordingly, homicide offences are the most serious. This is followed by
other crimes against the person. Studies show victims of violent and
sexual crime have their well-being more significantly set back than other
types of crime. For example, a review of the existing literature regarding
the effects of violent and sexual crimes on key quality of life indices112
demonstrated that many victims suffered considerably across a range of

110. Ian Leader-Elliott, Sentencing by Weight: Proposed Changes to the Commonwealth Code
Serious Drug Offences, 36 CRIM. L.J. 265 (2012) (quoting GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN
ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS 43 (1993)) (footnotes omitted).
111. Mirko Bagaric, Injecting Content into the Mirage that is Proportionality in Sentencing, 25
N.Z.U. L. REV. 411 (2013).
112. Rochelle Hanson et al., The Impact of Crime Victimization on Quality of Life, 23 J.
TRAUMATIC STRESS 189, 189 (2010).
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well-being indicia, well after the physical signs had passed.113 The report
concluded:
In sum, findings from the well-established literature on general
trauma and the emerging research on crime victimization indicate
significant functional impact on the quality of life for victims.
However, more research is necessary to understand the mechanisms
of these relationships and differences among types of crime
victimization, gender, and racial/ethnic groups.114

Findings showed that victims of violent and sexual crimes in
particular have diminished parenting skills;115 difficulty in being
involved in intimate relationships and higher divorce rates;116 higher
levels of unemployment;117 and less engagement and participation in
social and leisure activities.118 A United Kingdom study showed that
victims of sexual and violent crimes were 2.6 times more likely to suffer
from depression than other individuals,119 and one in twenty women who
had been seriously sexually assaulted attempted suicide.120
Another study examined the effects of either violent or property
crime on the health of 2,430 respondents.121 Lead author Chester L. Britt
noted, “Victims of violent crime reported lower levels of perceived
health and physical well being, controlling for measures of injury and for
socio demographic characteristics.”122 Further, these findings were not
confined to violent crime. Victims of property crime also reported
reduced levels of perceived well-being, but it was less profound than in
the case of violent crime.123
Given the damage inflicted by serious violent and sexual offences,
there is a sound argument that imprisonment is the only proportionate
response to these offences. Any softer sanction would fail to reflect the
gravity of such offences. Accordingly, we do not propose that the new
113. Id. at 194–95.
114. Id. at 194.
115. Id. at 190–91.
116. Id. at 191–92.
117. Id. at 192–93.
118. Id. at 193–94.
119. Mike Dixon, et al., The Unequal Impact of Crime, INST. OF PUB. POL’Y RES. 25 (Apr.
2006),
http://www.ippr.org/files/images/media/files/publication/2011/05/crimeshare_1500.pdf?
noredirect=1 [https://perma.cc/3GQ8-837D].
120. Id. at 17.
121. Chester L. Britt, Health Consequences of Criminal Victimization, 8 INT’L REV.
VICTIMOLOGY 63, 63 (2001).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 69–70; see also Adriaan J.M. Denkers & Frans Willem Winkel, Crime Victims’
Well-Being and Fear in a Prospective and Longitudinal Study, 5 INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 141,
155–56 (1998).
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sanctions should be targeted at such offending. This, however, does not
undermine the enormous utility of our proposal. Approximately half of
the offenders in U.S. state and federal prisons are not detained for sexual
or violent offences and hence could potentially be dealt with by way of
the alternative sanctions proposed in this Article, constituting a saving of
billions of dollars in misspent prison expenditures.124
B. Targeting Other Important Human Interests:
Employment and Education Sanctions
The increased use of monitoring devices is an illustration of
technology positively shaping the development of the criminal justice
system. However, potential improvements in this domain are not totally
reliant on scientific advancements. Different theoretical perspectives can
have similar outcomes. To this end, it is proposed that a fresh and
wide-ranging approach to the nature of criminal punishment and core
human interests supports the establishment of a number of new criminal
sanctions, namely the “employment sanction” and the “education
sanction.”125
Many people spend an enormous amount of time, energy, and
resources obtaining an education and working. The widespread nature
and intensity of the desires to obtain an education and career makes these
interests prime targets for inflicting hardships on offenders. We now
outline how the proposed sanctions could operate.

124. In 2014, there were 1,325,305 prisoners in U.S. state prisons. The most serious offence
categories for these prisoners were: violent 704,800; property 255,600; drug 208,000; public order
146,300; other 10,600. There are 192,663 prisoners in U.S. federal prisons. Their most serious
offences were: violent 14,100; property 11,600; drug 96,500; public order 69,100; and other 21,400.
Thus, less than half of the total inmates (47%) in federal and state prisons are imprisoned for sexual
and violent offences. Prisoners in 2014, NCJ 248955, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., 7 (Sept. 2015). In
addition to this, there were an estimated 744,600 inmates in local jails. The Nation’s Jails Held
Fewer Inmates At Midyear 2014 Compared to Their Peak Count in 2008, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT.
(June
11,
2015,
10:00
AM),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/jim14pr.cfm
[https://perma.cc/3HQS-EFE7]. This data is not as accurate: “Collects data from a nationally
representative sample of local jails on jail inmate populations, jail capacity, and related information.
The collection began in 1982 and has been conducted annually, except for years 1983, 1988, 1993,
1999, and 2005, during which a complete census of U.S. local jails was conducted.” DATA
COLLECTION:
ANNUAL
SURVEY
OF
JAILS,
BJS.GOV,
(June
11,
2015)
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=261 [https://perma.cc/V9CJ-GHLV].
125. These sanctions were first canvassed in the Australian and UK context over a decade ago.
See Mirko Bagaric, New Criminal Sanctions: Inflicting Pain Through the Denial of Employment and
Education, CRIM. L. REV. 184–204 (2001). The environment in the United States is now more
conducive to implementation of the sanctions given the high incarceration rates and costs associated
with them, as we have noted above. The circumstances in which these sanctions should be imposed
have changed in light of emerging empirical evidence regarding the efficacy of state imposed
sanctions to achieve the orthodox aims of sentencing.
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1. The Features of the Employment Sanction
The employment sanction would consist of an order prohibiting an
offender from engaging in employment where the offender derives
income in excess of that which is necessary to provide for the necessities
of life for a defined period. In pragmatic terms, this means that for the
duration of the sanction the offender would not be permitted to earn an
income in excess of the level of poverty.126
This could constitute a considerable unpleasantness to potentially a
large number of people. Currently, there are approximately 253 million
Americans in the adult civilian (noninstitutional) population.127 More
than 158 million of this population has employment.128 Approximately
94 million are not in the labor force (for example, because they are
caring for children or are retired).129 There are 7.9 million people, about
five percent of the adult population, who are unemployed.130
The inability to derive a meaningful income would obviously set
back the economic and financial interests of offenders. It would also
curtail the freedom that is associated with financial wealth. Thus,
offenders would be limited in their spending options and experience a
greatly diminished capacity to, for example, travel and socialise.
In addition to this, for many people the deprivation associated with
the employment sanction would go beyond that associated with having
no or little income. This is because many individuals, at least in part,
define themselves by their jobs. “Humans realize themselves through
activity, and though that activity need not be work, productive work
activity represents one of the major ways in which we break the bonds of
solipsistic subjectivity and are able to influence the world beyond us.”131
The association between work, identity, and flourishing is
supported by empirical studies into human well-being, which establish

126. In the United States, 15% of the population live in poverty. See CARMEN
DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., I NCOME , P OVERTY AND HEALTH INSURANCE C OVERAGE IN THE
UNITED
S TATES:
2012,
U.S.
C ENSUS
B UREAU
13
(Sept.
2013),
http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p60-245.pdf [https://perma.cc/E95G-YDX4]. This is defined
as an annual income of 50% of the official poverty line; for an individual this amounts to $11,720
annually, and for a family of four it is $23,492. Id. at 51. In 2012, 20.4 million Americans reported
an income “below one-half of their poverty threshold.” Id. at 18.
127. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Stat., The Unemployment Situation,
(April–May 2016).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Kleinig, supra note 66, at 293.
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that the more challenged a person is—whether by a job, hobby, or
sport—the happier he or she is likely to be.132
In order for the employment sanction to be effective, it is important
that it be monitored and enforced relatively efficiently. In order for this
to occur, existing government systems that are used to track and identify
individuals should be used to record the existence of any work sanction.
For example, each American citizen and permanent resident has a unique
social security number, which is used not only for social security
payments but also for taxation identification and payment purposes.133
These details must be provided to prospective employers in order for an
employer to deduct the appropriate amount of taxation and pay the
employee.134 It would be a relatively simple measure for court orders
relating to employment sanctions to be linked to an individual’s social
security number. In this way a “clean” social security number would
serve as a “licence” to work and earn income above the designated
income threshold.
2. The Features of the Education Sanction
Education is a highly desired commodity. Not only does it
empower and enable people to make better and more informed choices
and decisions, but it also provides people with the credentials that are a
threshold requirement for a range of jobs and professions. The
importance and value that people place on obtaining an education is
illustrated by the high number of people in the United States with a
formal education and the number currently progressing toward that goal.
It is also shown through the lengths that people go to in order to secure
an education.
Currently, there are more than 20 million Americans attending
American colleges and universities.135 Further, there are approximately
70 million Americans with a bachelor’s (or higher) degree.136 The cost of
undertaking a bachelor’s degree in the United States can readily exceed
$10,000 in tuition fees alone.137 Despite such fees, most people have a
132. See M. Bagaric & J. McConvill, Goodbye Justice, Hello Happiness: Welcoming Positive
Psychology to the Law, 10 DEAKIN L. REV. 1 (2005) (Austl.).
133. 26 U.S.C. § 6109 (2012).
134.
Form
W-4,
Employee’s
Withholding
Allowance
Certificate,
IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/uac/About-Form-W4 [https://perma.cc/9WCU-YH4X].
135. Fast Facts: Back to School Statistics, NAT’L CENTRE FOR EDUC. STAT.,
http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=372 [https://perma.cc/MV4T-XE3J].
136. Educational Attainment in the United States: 2014 - Detailed Table, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/2014/tables.html [https://perma.
cc/E98J-XEEF].
137. Fast Facts: Tuition Costs of Colleges and Universities, NAT’L CENTER FOR EDUC. STAT.,
https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=76 [https://perma.cc/9YCR-K9KY]; see also Laura

86

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 40:57

strong desire to attain a formal education, with demand greatly
outstripping the availability of places in many programs. Thus, there is
no question that limiting the utility of people’s educational achievements
would considerably set back their interests.
The education sanction would come in two, broad forms. The
milder form of the sanction would prohibit people from enrolling in or
continuing with any course in which they are enrolled for the duration of
the court order.138 The harsher version of the sanction would be
applicable to people with a formal college, university, trade, or other
degree or certificate. It would operate in two ways. Most commonly, it
would suspend the work privileges that are associated with the
qualification or credential for a designated period. This would mean that
for the period of disqualification, the offender could not work in any
field where a formal qualification of the relevant type was necessary. In
its most punitive form, the sanction would operate to permanently void
the qualification, thereby forever depriving the offender of the pragmatic
functionality of his or her education.
As with the employment sanction, it is important to ensure that any
compliance and monitoring costs associated with the education sanction
are minimal. There are a number of ways in which educational
deprivations could be recorded and promulgated. One measure would be
to simply record them as part of the information contained with an
individual’s social security number and IRS details. Alternatively, an
“Education Termination and Suspension” (or similar) register could be
established, which would keep records of all people disqualified from
study and of any suspensions or disqualification of credentials. The
information should be publicly available so that it could be accessed by
educational institutes and prospective employers.
Some aspects of the education (and employment) sanction are
already effectively imposed in some jurisdictions. Many professional
bodies have a process whereby members who are convicted of criminal
offences risk losing their licence to practice—for example, the medical
and legal professions. The advantage of the education sanction, however,
is that it makes this process more wide-ranging and integrated.

Bridgestock, How Much Does it Cost to Study in the US?, TOPUNIVERSITIES (Jan. 30, 2015, 12:00
AM), http://www.topuniversities.com/student-info/student-finance/how-much-does-it-cost-study-us
[https://perma.cc/GQC6-RS5F].
138. For reasons discussed below, this sanction should only be imposed where EM and the
employment sanction are not appropriate.
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C. The Circumstances in Which the Sanctions Are Appropriate
The circumstances in which the new sanctions should be imposed
can be summarised as follows: The new sanctions should be available as
a sentencing option in all cases where a term of imprisonment would
otherwise be imposed, except where one of the following two
preconditions applies:
(a) The offence is such that only a jail term is commensurate with the
gravity of the crime; or
(b) The personal circumstances of the offender are such that neither an
employment deprivation nor an education suspension or cancellation
will inconvenience him or her.

We will now expand further on each of these considerations.
The first consideration involves gauging the severity of the
respective sanctions. This principally turns on the extent to which the
interests of the offender would be frustrated or set back as a result of
being subjected to the sanctions.139 There is no clear answer to this given
the diversity of human preferences and activities. However, in light of
the considerable time, energy, and resources that people spend pursuing
educational and vocational pursuits, it is clear that these interests are
generally highly coveted. It follows then that the deprivation of or
interference with these interests would constitute significant
unpleasantness to most people.
In crude terms, the hardship resulting from having one’s degree
cancelled would be similar to a term of imprisonment of about the same
length that it took to acquire the degree. Thus, cancellation of a
three-year law degree would have a similar negative impact on a person
as a three-year jail term. As we have seen, the pains of imprisonment
often extend beyond the time an offender spends behind bars, but so too
would the deprivation associated with an annulment of a formal
educational qualification. Such a sanction would not only largely negate
the utility of past endeavours but also deny the offender the future benefit
of the qualification, which in many cases may relate to a period of
several decades.
Suspending one’s educational qualification does not totally deny an
offender the utility of the qualification, given that the qualification shall
return after the disqualification period has lapsed, and hence it is not
tenable to rate this as equivalent to the hardship stemming from the
cancellation of an educational sanction. Accordingly, it is proposed that
suspending one’s educational qualifications is half as burdensome as
139. Bagaric, supra note 111.
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annulling the qualification. Relatively speaking, disqualifying an
offender from participating in a formal course of education is less
burdensome than either cancelling or suspending an educational
qualification. Being enrolled in an educational program provides the
student with an opportunity to attain the relevant credential. Denial of
this opportunity should be regarded as being approximately half the
deprivation stemming from suspension of a qualification.
The employment sanction is not as harsh as the education sanction
because the employment sanction only impacts the future aspirations of
an offender. Despite this, it would still constitute considerable
unpleasantness for most people based on the fact that it deprives them of
the capacity to earn a meaningful amount of income and the ability to
fully explore and develop their workplace potential. Given that most
individuals who have the opportunity to work spend about half of their
productive time (not including weekends) doing so,140 the employment
sanction is approximately half as severe as imprisonment.
We now expand on precondition (a). As noted above, the principle
of proportionality is the main determinant regarding the severity of
criminal punishment, and it is necessary to match this with the harm
caused by the offence. As we saw, empirical evidence establishes that
sexual and violent crimes inflict the most harm to victims. The damage
caused by serious offences of this nature is often so profound and
enduring that imprisonment is the only appropriate response. However,
as is the case with EM (with or without CCTV), there is no basis for
asserting that other offences cannot be dealt with by alternative
sanctions, including the proposed employment and education sanctions.
At first glance, it may appear that the proportion of offenders who
are suitable candidates for the education sanction is limited, given that
many people appearing before the criminal courts have no formal
educational. The National Research Council recognised that “[one-third
of] white male high school dropouts born in the late 1970s . . . are
estimated to have served time in prison by their mid-30s. . . . [A]mong
black male high school dropouts, about two-thirds have a prison record
by that same age.”141 Notably, the correlation between low educational
attainment and incarceration is very high for racial minorities: “African
American men born since the late 1960s are more likely to have served
time in prison than to have completed college with a 4-year degree.”142
140. Benjamin Snyder & Stacy Jones, Americans Work Hard, But People in These 15
Countries
Work
Longer
Hours,
FORTUNE
(Nov
11,
2015,
11:10
AM),
http://fortune.com/2015/11/11/chart-work-week-oecd/ [https://perma.cc/DYG6-CAZG].
141. GROWTH OF INCARCERATION, supra note 2, at 5.
142. Id. at 13 (citing Pettit and Western, 2004; Pettit, 2012).
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However, at least ten percent of prisoners have postsecondary
education.143
Further, people are disadvantaged not only by the denial of a
concrete commodity, but also by the denial of the opportunity to pursue
and explore their preferences and projects. It is largely for this reason
that formal barriers to access, by certain groups, of social goods and
services is unacceptable. Although there are often disparities along
racial, ethnic, and gender lines in terms of enrollment in educational
courses (and employment in elite professions), communities are often
willing to tolerate these disparities provided that there are no formal
barriers to minority and disadvantaged groups participating in such
practices.
Opportunity or potential—though neither may ever be realised—are
desirable virtues. This observation is especially appropriate in relation to
the employment sanction. Few people have no desire to engage in
employment that will provide them with a meaningful level of income.
Therefore, even offenders who are not employed at the time of
sentencing are likely to be harmed by the imposition of a formal obstacle
to securing meaningful employment. Thus, the employment sanction is
suitable even for the unemployed. However, offenders who are employed
at the time of sentencing suffer a greater hardship than those who are
unemployed. The additional hardship stemming from loss of an existing
job could be accommodated by a deduction, of twenty percent for
example, from the length of the employment sanction.
The education sanction is obviously relevant to all offenders with a
formal qualification and to those enrolled in an educational program.
Moreover, it would also be potentially suitable to offenders who are
relatively young and presumably aspirational and ambitious. By contrast,
the sanction is not likely to cause any pain to an offender who has not
enrolled in a course of education for, say, more than twenty years and
has displayed no genuine interest in ever doing so. Offenders with such a
profile would not be suitable for the education sanction, and the more
appropriate alternative sanction would either be the employment sanction
or EM monitoring.144
In summary, the main interests that are targeted by criminal
sanctions are liberty and financial wealth. These do not fully encompass
143. Stephanie Ewert & Tara Wildhagen, Educational Characteristics of Prisoners: Data from
the ACS 3 (U.S. Census Bureau, Housing and Household Economic Statistics Division, Working
Paper No. 2011-8, 2011), http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/acs/.
144. As discussed below, these sanctions in most circumstances should be preferred over a
disqualification relating to future study even in relation to offenders who are enrolled in an
educational course.
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the important areas of human concern or endeavour. People, through
their conduct, demonstrate that they have a strong desire to attain
educational qualifications and to work. These interests should also be
targeted by criminal sanctions. Key advantages with a reform of this
nature are that (i) monitoring and enforcement costs are relatively low
and (ii) the sanctions could provide an alternative to imprisonment in
relation to all offence types, except serious sexual and violent offences.
We now address possible objections to these proposed reforms.
IV. PROPOSED REFORMS WILL NOT LEAD TO MORE CRIME
The proposed new sanctions could be criticized on the basis that
they may lead to more crime by undermining the goal of incapacitation,
diluting the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions and diminishing the
rehabilitative prospects of offenders. However, a close assessment of the
goals of sentencing, the efficacy of the criminal justice system to achieve
the orthodox objectives of sentencing, and a strategic approach to the
applicability of the new sanctions (which is adapted in light of the
appropriate and attainable objectives of sentencing) can surmount any
possible unintended adverse consequences associated with implementing
the proposed new sanctions. The discussion below focuses centrally on
the employment and education sanction (given its novelty), but is also
applicable to EM (with or without CCTV).
General deterrence and incapacitation have been widely used to
justify the move toward harsher criminal sanctions. The main reason for
increased incarceration levels has been the imposition of longer
sentences.145 Specific deterrence has been invoked to a lesser degree to
justify the same objective. In exploring the impact of new sanctions on
these objectives, the logical starting point is the efficacy of punishment
to achieve these goals. If it transpires that criminal sanctions, and in
particular imprisonment, cannot attain these goals, then it is untenable to
argue against the new sanctions on the basis of frustration of existing
sentencing aims.
We now examine whether these objectives are achievable. There is
a vast body of literature regarding these sentencing objectives, and these
topics have been the subject of extensive recent analysis.146 The
145. See ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 13, at 3 (noting that “[c]hanges in the severity
of sentencing and enforcement, which have led to longer sentences and higher conviction rates for
nearly all offenses, have been the primary drivers of the incarceration boom”).
146. See Mirko Bagaric & Theo Alexander, The Capacity of Criminal Sanctions to Shape the
Behaviour of Offenders: Specific Deterrence Doesn’t Work, Rehabilitation Might and the
Implications For Sentencing, 36 CRIM. L.J. 159 (2012) [hereinafter The Capacity of Criminal
Sanctions]; Mirko Bagaric & Theo Alexander, The Fallacy That Is Incapacitation: An Argument for
Limiting Imprisonment Only to Sex and Violent Offenders, 2 J. COMMONWEALTH CRIM. L. 95 (2012)
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discussion below summarizes the main studies in relation to each
relevant sentencing objective and the current state of knowledge. This is
made easier by the fact that there is a relatively clear consensus in
regards to each of the areas. We start with the objectives in relation to
which the evidence is most clear-cut.
A. The Deterrence Objective Will Not Be Undermined
1. Specific Deterrence Does Not Work
Specific deterrence aims to reduce crime by punishing individual
offenders for their crimes and thereby convincing them that crime does
not pay. It attempts to deter offenders from reoffending by inflicting a
hardship on them, which presumably they will seek to avoid in the
future.147 However, the empirical data focusing on this theory suggests
that it is flawed. It is a case of common sense being rebutted by research
findings.
There have been numerous studies across a wide range of
jurisdictions and different time periods that reject the theory of specific
deterrence.148 Two theorists149 observed the reoffending of 1,003
offenders who were initially sentenced for drug-related offences between
June 2002 and May 2003 by a number of different judges whose
sentencing approaches varied significantly (some were described as
“punitive,” others as “lenient”), resulting in differing terms of
imprisonment and probation.150 The study concluded that neither the
length of imprisonment nor the probation had an effect on the rate of
reoffending during the four-year, follow-up period.151
A different but extensive wide-ranging analysis of the relevant
literature on specific deterrence was undertaken in 2009.152 The team
[hereinafter The Fallacy that is Incapacitation]; Mirko Bagaric & Theo Alexander, (Marginal)
General Deterrence Doesn’t Work—And What it Means for Sentencing, 35 CRIM. L.J. 269 (2011).
Most recently, one of us summarised the literature in Mirko Bagaric, The Punishment Should Fit the
Crime–Not the Prior Convictions of the Person that Committed the Crime: An Argument for Less
Impact Being Accorded to Previous Convictions in Sentencing, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 343 (2014)
[hereinafter The Punishment Should Fit the Crime].
147. The Capacity of Criminal Sanctions, supra note 146, at 159.
148. See The Capacity of Criminal Sanctions, supra note 146 for a review of the studies.
149. See Donald P. Green & Daniel Winik, Using Random Judge Assignments to Estimate the
Effects of Incarceration and Probation on Recidivism Among Drug Offenders, 48 CRIMINOLOGY
357, 357–58 (2010).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See Daniel S. Nagin, Francis T. Cullen & Cheryl Lero Jonson, Imprisonment &
Reoffending, 38 CRIME & JUST. 115, 145 (2009); see also Donald Ritchie, Does Imprisonment
Deter? A Review of the Evidence, SENT’G ADVISORY COUNCIL (Apr. 18, 2011),
https://www.sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.au/publications/does-imprisonment-deter
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reviewed the impact of custodial sanctions versus noncustodial sanctions
and the effect of sentence length on reoffending. The review examined
six experimental studies where custodial versus noncustodial sentences
were randomly assigned;153 eleven studies that involved matched pairs;154
thirty-one studies that were regression based;155 and seven other studies
that did not neatly fit into any of those three categories and included
naturally occurring social experiments that allowed inferences to be
drawn regarding the capacity of imprisonment to deter offenders.
These theorists concluded that offenders who are sentenced to
imprisonment do not have a lower rate of recidivism than those who
receive a noncustodial penalty.156 In fact, some studies show the rate of
recidivism among offenders sentenced to imprisonment to be higher.157
This review concluded that:
Taken as a whole, it is our judgment that the experimental studies
point more toward a criminogenic [that is, the possible corrupting
effects of punishment] rather than preventive effect of custodial
sanctions. The evidence for this conclusion, however, is weak
because it is based on only a small number of studies, and many of
the point estimates are not statistically significant.158

This is consistent with more recent analysis, which suggests an
even stronger link between imprisonment and an increased risk of
reoffending. A report published in 2016 that surveyed the data regarding
the connection between incarcerations and recidivism notes:
[A] growing body of work has found that incarceration increases
recidivism. This research compares outcomes of defendants with
similar characteristics and offenses and uses the random assignment
of defendants to judges to predict a defendant’s assigned sentence,
based only on the judge’s historical sentencing behavior. For
instance, one recent study that uses highly detailed data from Texas
uses this design and finds that although initial incarceration prevents
crime through incapacitation, each additional sentence year causes
an increase in future offending that eventually outweighs the

[https://perma.cc/446X-PSZU]; Don Weatherburn et al., The Specific Deterrent Effect of Custodial
Penalties on Juvenile Reoffending, AUSTRALIAN INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY (2009),
http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/current%20series/tbp/21-40/tbp033.html [https://perma.cc/Z5F8PTN4].
153. Nagin, Cullen & Jonson, supra note 152, at 144–45.
154. Id. at 145–54.
155. Id. at 154–55.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 145.
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incapacitation benefit. Each additional sentence year leads to a 4 to
7 percentage point increase in recidivism after release.159

Accordingly, the weight of evidence supports the view that
subjecting offenders to harsh punishment is unlikely to increase the
prospect that they will become law-abiding citizens in the future. It
follows that the goal of specific deterrence cannot be achieved by the
imposition of criminal sanctions and should not influence sentencing
practice, particularly the nature, structure, and content of proposed
criminal sanctions.
2. General Deterrence (Also) Does Not Work
The other form of deterrence is general deterrence. This is the
theory that harsh penalties will reduce crime because many potential
offenders will not engage in conduct that can result in them being subject
to criminal sanctions. There are in fact two forms of general deterrence:
marginal and absolute. Marginal general deterrence is the view that there
is a connection between offence severity and the crime rate. Absolute
general deterrence is the more modest claim that the mere existence of
criminal sanctions, irrespective of their severity, will reduce crime.160
The empirical data on general deterrence suggests that absolute general
deterrence is a valid theory. However, marginal general deterrence seems
to be flawed.
This seems to be the case in relation to all penalty types. There has
been a considerable degree of debate regarding the efficacy of capital
punishment to deter crime.161 However, the weight of evidence and
informed sentiment162 suggests that there is no firm basis for believing
that capital punishment reduces crime. The most wide-ranging recent
analysis of the impact of the death penalty on crime is by the National
Research Council of the National Academies, which was released in
2012. The report concluded:
159. ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 13, at 39.
160. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN
CRIME CONTROL 14 (1973).
161. Dale O. Cloninger & Roberto Marchesini, Execution and Deterrence: A Quasi-Controlled
Group Experiment, 33 APPLIED ECON. 569 (2001) suggested that capital punishment can deter
crime, but contrary conclusions are reached in a number of other studies. See, e.g., John K. Cochran
et al., Deterrence or Brutalization? An Impact Assessment of Oklahoma’s Return to Capital
Punishment, 32 CRIMINOLOGY 107, 129 (1994); Richard Berk, New Claims about Executions and
General Deterrence: Déjà Vu All Over Again?, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 303, 328 (2005). For
an overview of the numerous studies, see Jeffrey Fagan, Death and Deterrence Redux: Science, Law
and Causal Reasoning on Capital Punishment, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255 (2006).
162. Michael Booth, No Credible Evidence on Whether Death Penalty Deters, Experts Say,
DENVER POST (June 2, 2013, 2:11 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/2013/06/02/no-credibleevidence-on-whether-death-penalty-deters-experts-say/ [https://perma.cc/9J9C-SDJJ].
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[R]esearch to date on the effect of capital punishment on homicide
is not informative about whether capital punishment decreases,
increases, or has no effect on homicide rates. Therefore, the
committee recommends that these studies not be used to inform
deliberations requiring judgments about the effect of the death
penalty on homicide. Consequently, claims that research
demonstrates that capital punishment decreases or increases the
homicide rate by a specified amount or has no effect on the
homicide rate should not influence policy judgments about capital
punishment.163

The National Research Council, in a more recent report published
in 2014, analysed a large number of studies that examined the connection
between harsh criminal sanctions (other than capital punishment—and
especially longer prison terms stemming from mandatory minimum
penalties) and the crime rate and noted that the weight of evidence does
not support the view that harsh penalties reduce crime. The report states:
Ludwig and Raphael (2003) find no deterrent effect of enhanced
sentences for gun crimes; Lee and McCrary (2009) and Hjalmarsson
(2009) find no evidence that the more severe penalties that attend
moving from the juvenile to the adult justice system deter
offending; and Helland and Tabarrok (2007) find only a small
deterrent effect of the third strike of California’s three strikes law.
As a consequence, the deterrent return to increasing already long
sentences is modest at best.164

The extract above, while doubting the link between harsher
penalties and less crime, suggests that there is a connection between
lower crime and the perception in people’s minds that if they commit an
offence, they will be apprehended and subjected to some form of a
criminal sanction. This is consistent with the theory of absolute general
deterrence and the orthodox understanding about the considerations that
reduce crime.
Perhaps the strongest evidence substantiating absolute general
deterrence comes from crime-rate and policing patterns in the United
States over the past thirty years. The past three decades have seen a
significant reduction in crime165 and a big increase in police numbers.166
This connection is not necessarily causative because of the many other
163. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DETERRENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 102 (Daniel S.
Nagin & John V. Pepper eds., 2012).
164. GROWTH OF INCARCERATION, supra note 2, at 139–40.
165. Id.
166. See Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors That
Explain the Decline and Six That Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 163, 177 (2004) (estimating the
increase to be about fourteen percent).
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changes that occurred during this period, which may also have impacted
the crime rate, such as better police methods, increased penalties, or
greater incarceration numbers. However, the evidence suggests that the
increased perceived likelihood of detection has contributed substantially
to the reduction in crime.167
After evaluating the large number of surveys analysing the
connection between more police and the crime rate, Professor Raymond
Paternoster at the University of Maryland concludes:
What we are left with, then, is that clearly police presence deters
crime, but it is probably very difficult to say with any degree of
precision how much it deters. Let us take Levitt’s estimate as a
reasonable guess, that increasing the size of the police force by 10%
will reduce crime by about 4% or 5%.168

Accordingly, marginal general deterrence seems to be a flawed
theory, while absolute general deterrence is a sound theory. The keys to
reducing crime are (i) ensuring that criminal sanctions (which people
would want to avoid) exist and (ii) putting in place processes whereby
potential offenders perceive they will be apprehended if they commit a
crime. The proposed new sanctions are adequate in this regard, given that
people would seek to avoid them and that they can be implemented
relatively easily.
3. Incapacitation
Incapacitation is often used interchangeably with the objective of
community protection. Incapacitation protects the community by
imprisoning offenders, thus ensuring that during their period of
incarceration they cannot commit other offences in the community. It is
important to understand that the effectiveness of incapacitation cannot be
evaluated solely by reference to the inability of offenders to commit
crime while in prison. Incapacitation is only effective as a form of
community protection if offenders would have engaged in criminal
conduct had they not been imprisoned.169

167. For further discussion, see John E. Eck & Edward R. Maguire, Have Changes in Policing
Reduced Violent Crime? An Assessment of the Evidence, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 207, 248
(Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., 2000); ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 13, at 38.
168. Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal Deterrence?, 100
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 799 (2010).
169. See Kevin Bennardo, Incarceration’s Incapacitative Shortcomings, 54 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 1 (2014) (noting that some incapacitative models assume that prison is not part of society); see
also Colin Murray, ‘To Punish, Deter and Incapacitate’: Incarceration and Radicalisation in UK
Prisons after 9/11, in PRISONS, TERRORISM AND EXTREMISM (Andrew Silke ed., 2013) (noting that
for incapacitation to work, it is important that inmates do not corrupt other prisoners).
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There are two types of incapacitation: selective and general.
Selective incapacitation targets individual offenders. It contends that
offenders who will reoffend should be imprisoned. Its effectiveness is
contingent upon the accuracy of predicting which offenders will
reoffend. Much of the research in this area has been focused on offenders
who have committed serious offences.170
A wide-ranging analysis in the 1990s of the data regarding the
capacity of any discipline to predict future criminal behaviour noted that
predictive techniques “tend to invite overestimation of the amount of
incapacitation to be expected from marginal increments in
imprisonment.”171 More recent actuarial tools have been developed to
score a person’s level of risk by mapping his or her profile to variables
that are known risk factors. Structured professional judgment and
criminogenic risk assessment also use a range of variables,172 which are
designed to be more nuanced than actuarial tools because they aim to not
only predict the likelihood of violence, but also the imminence, severity,
and possible targets of the risk.173 These more recent attempts to
accurately predict dangerousness in the context of violent and sexual
offences have also proven to be deficient.174
The other form of incapacitation is general incapacitation.175 This is
a much cruder theory and approach. It involves imprisoning offenders
simply because they have committed a criminal offence on the basis that
while in prison they cannot inflict harm in the general community. Little
or no effort is normally made to predict future offending patterns,
170. See The Fallacy That Is Incapacitation, supra note 146, at 104–05 (discussing research
predicting which serious offenders will reoffend).
171. FRANK E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL CONFINEMENT AND
THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME 86 (1995).
172. The LSI-R assessment model, which is used in New South Wales, has 54 variables. See
NEW SOUTH WALES SENTENCING COUNCIL, HIGH-RISK VIOLENT OFFENDERS: SENTENCING AND
POST-CUSTODY MANAGEMENT OPTIONS 23 (2012), http://www.sentencingcouncil.justice.nsw.
gov.au/Documents/Sentencing_Serious_Violent_Offenders/online%20final%20report%20hrvo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V9ES-2NAW].
173. For a discussion of these tools, see id. at 20–24.
174. See BERNADETTE MCSHERRY & PATRICK KEYZER, SEX OFFENDERS AND PREVENTIVE
DETENTION: POLITICS, POLICY AND PRACTICE (2009); Jessica Black, Is the Preventive Detention of
Dangerous Offenders Justifiable?, 6 J. APPLIED SEC. RES. 317, 322–23 (2011). See generally
DANGEROUS PEOPLE: POLICY, PREDICTION, AND PRACTICE (Bernadette McSherry & Patrick Keyzer
eds., 2011). Most recently it has been suggested that habitual criminals and serious offenders have a
different brain anatomy compared to other people. Neuroimaging of the brain showed that such
offenders have less brain activity in certain areas of the brain, including the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which are associated with self-awareness, learning from
past experiences, and emotions. See ADRIAN RAINE, ANATOMY OF VIOLENCE: THE BIOLOGICAL
ROOTS OF CRIME (2013).
175. For a discussion regarding the distinction between special and collective incapacitation,
see ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 171, at 60–75.
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whether on the basis of previous criminal history or other
considerations.176 There is no clear line between selective and general
incapacitation, and the difference is often simply one of degree. While
selective incapacitation focuses on individual offenders and general
incapacitation is population-based, once large numbers of offenders are
imprisoned on the basis of predictive criteria (such as prior criminality),
which is demonstrably flawed, then a process that may have initially had
the appearance of selective incapacitation turns into a system of general
incapacitation. All jurisdictions punish recidivists more severely than
first-time offenders.177 Often the extent of the premium is so significant
that this has effectively evolved into a process of general
incapacitation.178
Theoretically, general incapacitation should work because the more
people there are in prison, the fewer people there are who could commit
crime in the general community. Accordingly, it should follow that this
will reduce the crime rate. And indeed, the weight of evidence supports
the view that general incapacitation works.
In the United States between 1993 and 2010, the rate of violent
victimization rates decreased by 76% and the decline in total household
property crime victimization was 64%.179 During this period, the
imprisonment rate rose from 1.37 million to 2.27 million prisoners.180 At
face value, these figures suggest a causal link between imprisoning
greater numbers of offenders and an effective reduction in the crime rate.
Professor William Spelman has calculated that up to 21% of crime
reduction is attributable to the increased rate of imprisonment.181 Other
studies support the success of incapacitation but remain equally unclear

176. An exception is the Dutch law aimed at recidivists with ten prior convictions and which
only had minor enhancements for recidivists. For a discussion of this, see Ben Vollaard, Preventing
Crime Through Selective Incapacitation, 123 ECON. J. 262 (2013).
177. See The Punishment Should Fit the Crime, supra note 146, at 343.
178. Id.
179. See JANET L. LAURITSEN & MARIBETH L. REZEY, MEASURING THE PREVALENCE OF
CRIME
WITH
THE
NATIONAL
CRIME
VICTIMIZATION
SURVEY
1
(2013),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mpcncvs.pdf [https://perma.cc/48ML-DUCE].
180. Correctional Populations in the United States, 1993, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, iii
(1995) http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpop93bk.pdf [https://perma.cc/4RW5-AKE6] (the 1.37
million figure includes inmates in local jails (456,000) and state and federal prisons (909,000));
Correctional Populations in the United States, 2010, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 3 (2011),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus10.pdf [https://perma.cc/76VC-PJW5 ] (The 2.27 million
figure also includes inmates in local jails (749,000) and state and federal prisons (1,518,000)).
181. See William Spelman, What Recent Studies Do (and Don’t) Tell Us About Imprisonment
and Crime, 27 CRIME & JUST. 419, 486 (2000); see also William Spelman, The Limited Importance
of Prison Expansion, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 98 (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds.,
2000).
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about its precise impact.182 A recent report from the Executive Office of
the President of the United States, titled Economic Perspectives on
Incarceration and the Criminal Justice System,183 notes:
Criminal sanctions have the capacity to reduce crime through
deterrence and incapacitation; however, marginal increases in
incarceration may have small and declining benefits. Despite a large
expansion in the prison population over the last several decades, a
large body of research has generally found that the aggregate impact
of incarceration on crime is modest and that it declines as the prison
population grows. Researchers who study crime and incarceration
believe that the true impact of incarceration on crime reduction is
small, with a 10 percent increase in incarceration decreasing crime
by just 2 percent or less.184

A similar conclusion was reached by the National Research Council
in its 2014 survey of the data regarding the impact of incapacitation
policy in the United States in recent decades. The panel concluded:
Many studies have attempted to estimate the combined
incapacitation and deterrence effects of incarceration on crime using
panel data at the state level from the 1970s to the 1990s and 2000s.
Most studies estimate the crime-reducing effect of incarceration to
be small and some report that the size of the effect diminishes with
the scale of incarceration. Where adjustments are made for the
direct dependence of incarceration rates on crime rates, the
crime-reducing effects of incarceration are found to be larger. Thus,
the degree of dependence of the incarceration rate on the crime rate
is crucial to the interpretation of these studies. Several studies
influential for the committee’s conclusions in Chapters 3 and 4 find
that the direct dependence of the incarceration rate on the crime rate
is modest, lending credence to a small crime-reduction effect on
incarceration. However, research in this area is not unanimous and
the historical and legal analysis is hard to quantify. . . . On balance,
panel data studies support the conclusion that the growth in
incarceration rates reduced crime, but the magnitude of the crime
reduction remains highly uncertain and the evidence suggests it was
unlikely to have been large.185

While general incapacitation seems to have some validity, one
constant finding is that it is usually most effective in relation to minor
182. See LAURITSEN & REZEY, supra note 179, at 3–4; Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based
Sentencing: The Application of Principles of Evidence-Based Practice to State Sentencing Practice
and Policy, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 585, 594 (2009).
183. ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 13, at 36.
184. Id.
185. GROWTH OF INCARCERATION, supra note 2, at 155.

2016]

Progressive Alternatives to Imprisonment

99

crime, although some success can also be achieved in relation to more
serious crimes.186 This is because minor offenders reoffend more
frequently than serious offenders.
The effectiveness of general incapacitation for relatively minor
offences is supported by an Australian study published in 2006 titled,
How Much Crime Does Prison Stop? The Incapacitation Effect of Prison
On Burglary.187 The study measured the impact of imprisonment on
burglary rates. It concluded:
[A]t least so far as burglary is concerned, prison does seem to be an
effective crime control tool. Our best estimate of the incapacitation
effect of prison on burglary (based on the assumption that burglars
commit an average of 38 burglaries per year when free) is 26
percent. This estimate does not appear to be overly sensitive to the
value of offending frequency we assume. . . . These percentage
effects might not seem large but in absolute terms an incapacitation
effect of 26 per cent is equivalent to preventing over 44,700
burglaries per annum.188

However, the report then noted that the cost associated with using
imprisonment as a tool to reduce the burglary rate was too high:
The fact that prison is effective in preventing a large number of
burglaries raises the question of whether increased use of
imprisonment would be an effective way of further reducing the
burglary rate. Our findings on this issue, like those of incapacitation
studies in Britain and the United States (Cohen 1978; Tarling 1993),
are not that encouraging. They suggest that a doubling of the
sentence length for burglary would cost an additional $26 million
per annum but would only reduce the annual number of burglaries
by about eight percentage points. A doubling of the proportion of
convicted burglars would produce a larger effect (about 12
percentage points) but only if those who are the subject of our new
penal policy offend as frequently as those who are currently being
imprisoned. Given what we know about the frequency of offending
amongst burglars who do not currently receive a prison sentence,
this seems highly unlikely.189

Thus, in relation to relatively minor offences, incapacitation works.
However, while confining repeat minor criminals clearly disables them
186. See, e.g., Vollaard, supra note 176.
187. Don Weatherburn, Jiuzhao Hua & Steve Moffatt, How Much Crime Does Prison Stop?
The Incapacitation Effect of Prison on Burglary, 93 N.S.W. CRIME & JUST. BULL. 1 (2006),
http://www.bocsar.nsw.gov.au/Documents/CJB/cjb93.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6RF-6JDE].
188. Id. at 8.
189. Id. at 8–9.

100

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 40:57

from committing further offences in the community for a period of time,
it almost certainly does not justify the unrestrained use of imprisonment
to combat nonserious crime.190 These offenders should be subjected to an
incapacitative penalty, but governments need to develop more intelligent
alternatives to imprisonment that can monitor the activities of recidivist
minor offenders at a fraction of the cost of imprisonment.191 It follows
that the education and employment sanction would, in many cases, not
be appropriate for offenders who are habitual criminals. Instead, EM
would be most suitable for this type of offender.
Given the limits of predicting serious offending on the basis of
prior convictions, selective incapacitation for serious offences, on the
other hand, seems to be flawed. However, there is stronger evidence that
general incapacitation does work in relation to such offences. While most
serious offenders do not reoffend, individuals with previous convictions
for serious offences commit such crime at a much greater frequency than
the rest of the criminal population.192 Thus, there is some evidence
supporting the current incapacitative regime for serious sex and violent
offenders. They could theoretically also be subjected to monitoring
sanctions. However, it is not clear that this would be a desirable reform.
While such sanctions could monitor the activities of these offenders, as
noted above, arguably this response would undercut the goal of
proportionality.
4. Rehabilitation
Unlike the other key sentencing goals that have been analysed
above, rehabilitation (if it is effective) serves normally to decrease rather
than increase penalty severity193 and hence ostensibly cannot be used as a
counter to proposals to substitute imprisonment with less severe forms of
sanctions. However, an argument can be mounted that the education
sanction can have a negative impact on offender reform. Thus, an
assessment of the rehabilitative ideal is necessary.
Following extensive research conducted between 1960 and 1974,
Robert Martinson, a former sociologist, concluded in an influential paper
that empirical studies had not established that any rehabilitative

190. It is notoriously difficult to undertake an accurate cost-benefit analysis of imprisonment
given the large number of speculative figures involved. See, e.g., David S. Abrams, The Imprisoner’s
Dilemma: A Cost Benefit Approach to Incarceration, 98 IOWA L. REV 905, 915–16 (2013).
191. For suggestions, see The Fallacy That Is Incapacitation, supra note 146, at 114.
192. The Punishment Should Fit the Crime, supra note 146, at 410.
193. This generalization is not necessarily correct. As noted below, it seems that rehabilitation
programs can in some instances be effective in a custodial setting.
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programs had worked in reducing recidivism.194 The Panel of the
National Research Council in the United States, several years after this
work, also noted that there were no significant differences between the
subsequent recidivism rates of offenders regardless of the form of
punishment. They concluded, “This suggests that neither rehabilitative
nor criminogenic effects operate very strongly.”195
A more recent wide-ranging Australian study regarding the
effectiveness of rehabilitation for the Australian Institute of
Criminology196 focused on changes and improvements to prison-based
correction rehabilitation programs in the custodial environment since
2004, when the previous report was issued.197 The report summarized
recent cross-jurisdictional studies into the effectiveness of certain
rehabilitation programs. It noted that while there were mixed results,
there were some programs that reported positive outcomes.198
This was especially the case in relation to sexual offender
programs, where some studies showed that the recidivism rate of
offenders completing the program was about half that of other
offenders.199 The results of programs directed toward violent offenders
were less positive, but a wide-ranging review of studies focusing on
United Kingdom programs noted that reductions in offending for violent
offences by around seven to eight percent had occurred.200 There is no
cogent evidence supporting the effectiveness of domestic violence or
victim awareness programs.201 However, drug and alcohol programs have

194. Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers about Prison Reform, 35 PUB.
INTEREST 22, 25 (1974).
195. See DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL
SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 66 (Alfred Blumstein, Jacqueline Cohen & Daniel Nagin eds., 1978).
196. Karen Heseltine et al., Prison-Based Correctional Offender Rehabilitation Programs: The
2009 National Picture in Australia, in AIC REPORTS: RESEARCH AND PUBLIC POLICY SERIES 112
(2011), http://www.aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/rpp/112/rpp112.pdf [https://perma.cc/
879L-LPET].
197. Id. at 2.
198. Id.
199. See LEON BAKKER, AND THERE WAS LIGHT . . . : EVALUATING THE KIA MARAMA
TREATMENT PROGRAMME FOR NEW ZEALAND SEX OFFENDERS AGAINST CHILDREN (2007),
http://www.corrections.govt.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/665635/kiamarama.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X4J3-FSR6]; R. Karl Hanson et al., First Report of the Collaborative Outcome
Data Project on the Effectiveness of Psychological Treatment for Sex Offenders, 14 SEXUAL ABUSE
169 (2002).
200. Darrick Jolliffe & David P. Farrington, A Systematic Review of the National and
International Evidence on the Effectiveness of Interventions with Violent Offenders, in MINISTRY OF
JUSTICE RESEARCH SERIES iii (2007), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100505212400/
[https://perma.cc/P8X8-QZ5R].
201. Id. at 13–14.
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been shown to be effective at reducing substance abuse and
reoffending.202
This assessment is consistent with the findings of Ojmarrh Mitchell,
David B. Wilson, and Doris L. MacKenzie, who undertook a major
analysis of studies into the effectiveness of drug treatment programs in
prison.203 The studies they focused on related to drug users and compared
reoffending patterns of offenders who completed a drug rehabilitation
program with those who did not complete a program, or completed only
a minimum program between the years 1980 and 2004. They analysed
sixty-six studies in total.204 The report concluded: “Overall, this
meta-analytic synthesis of evaluations of incarceration based drug
treatment programs found that such programs are modestly effective in
reducing recidivism.”205 Moreover, it noted that programs that dealt with
the multiple problems of drug users (termed therapeutic communities)
were the most successful, whereas there was no evidence to support good
outcomes associated with “boot camp” programs.206
Thus, the weight of empirical data (though it is far from uniform or
consistent) suggests that rehabilitative programs can reduce the
likelihood of recidivism, especially for certain forms of offences, such as
sex-offences. However, the actual level of knowledge regarding the
impact of rehabilitative programs on recidivism rates is slight, and
arguably, no policy or legal changes should be heavily influenced by the
availability of these programs. If firm evidence emerges that offender or
offence-specific programs can considerably reduce recidivism, then there
is no reason that offenders subjected to the education or employment
sanction cannot be permitted or required to undertake such programs.
However, one activity that is known to meaningfully lower
reoffending levels is participation and completion of a generalized
educational program (in contrast to offence or offender specific
courses).207 There is relatively persuasive evidence that offenders who
complete postsecondary education programs recidivate at considerably
lower rates than other offenders. It has been noted that:
Studies clearly demonstrate that prisoners who participate in postsecondary correctional education have lower recidivism rates than
those who do not have access to higher education while
202. Id. at 20.
203. Ojmarrh Mitchell et al., The Effectiveness of Incarceration-Based Drug Treatment on
Criminal Behaviour, in CAMPBELL SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS 2006:11 (2006),
www.campbellcollaboration.org/lib/download/98/ [https://perma.cc/P9S8-2HQ6].
204. Id.
205. Id. at 17.
206. Id. at 13.
207. ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 13, at 63.
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incarcerated. For example, one analysis examined 15 different
studies conducted during the 1990s and found that 14 of these
studies showed reduced recidivism for former prisoners who had
participated in postsecondary correctional education. Recidivism
rates for these individuals were, on average, 46 percent lower than
for ex-offenders who had not taken college classes (Chappell 2004).
Such studies indicate that providing higher education to prisoners
can help ensure that they will not return to prison after release.208

The completion of such courses also enhances the job prospects of
offenders and increases their average earnings after they are released
from prison.209
In light of this, it could be countered that stripping educational
qualifications from offenders will have a negative impact on their
prospects of rehabilitation. However, this criticism is not sound. The
process of attaining an education is not simply related to obtaining
employment-related skills and knowledge. Learning assists people in
developing their cognitive capacities and problem-solving skills. It also
enhances their judgment. None of these capacities are diminished by the
suspension or removal of their formal qualifications. Accordingly, it is
doubtful that the education sanction would lead offenders to make poorer
choices regarding their future conduct.
A stronger argument can, however, be made that offenders (who do
not have existing educational qualifications) should not be denied the
opportunity to pursue an education given the link between postsecondary
education and lower offending. This is a powerful argument, in the
context of a move towards a more progressive sentencing system.
Accordingly, this form of the education sanction should be used
sparingly. It should only be used in circumstances when the employment
sanction and EM monitoring are not suitable because, for example, the
offender has no existing employment and has previously breached EM
restrictions. However, even in those circumstances, it is important to note
that the offender’s prospects of reoffending are probably not increased
given that but for the availability of this sentencing option, the offender
would have been incarcerated. As emerging evidence has shown, one
effect of imprisonment is that it increases future offending levels.

208. Jeanne B. Contardo & Wendy Erisman, Learning to Reduce Recidivism, in THE
INSTITUTE FOR HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY 9 (2005); see also David Skorton & Glenn Altschuler,
College Behind Bars: How Educating Prisoners Pays Off, FORBES (Mar. 25, 2013, 5:43 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/collegeprose/2013/03/25/college-behind-bars-how-educating-prisonerspays-off/#465501993b0f.
209. Id.
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B. Refining the Use of the Proposed New Sanctions in Light
of the Appropriate Aims of Sentencing
Accordingly, an examination of the efficacy of the sentencing
system to achieve the objectives of specific deterrence, general
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation suggests that none of these
aims will be frustrated by the development and implementation of the
new proposed sanctions. However, evaluating the suitability of the
sanctions through the lens of the appropriate objectives of sentencing has
resulted in some refinements regarding the optimal use of the sanctions.
Thus, it emerges that for recidivist minor offenders the most appropriate
alternative sanction is EM. Further, the prohibition on an offender from
undertaking a formal course of education should be used sparingly as a
sanction—only when the employment sanction and EM are not suitable.
V. ADDICTION TO IMPRISONMENT: COST EFFICIENCY BY OFFSHORING
TO EMERGING ECONOMIES
If it is necessary to jail offenders—and we recognise that public
safety impels the imprisonment of violent and sexual offenders—this has
to be done in a cost-efficient and humane way. The evidence indicates
that many states are not achieving these goals: U.S. prisons are both
costly and overcrowded. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in scathing
language in Brown v. Plata:
The degree of overcrowding in California’s prisons is exceptional.
California’s prisons are designed to house a population just under
80,000, but at the time of the three-judge court’s decision the
population was almost double that. The State’s prisons had operated
at around 200% of design capacity for at least 11 years. Prisoners
are crammed into spaces neither designed nor intended to house
inmates. As many as 200 prisoners may live in a gymnasium,
monitored by as few as two or three correctional officers. As many
as 54 prisoners may share a single toilet.210

If that is the reality, then expediency must be consistently applied at
all relevant levels. This means that the cost of imprisonment should be
minimised. One option is to take advantage of differences in prison costs
across the U.S. and locate incarceration facilities in states with low costs.
Then, prisoners could be housed in these cheaper states regardless of
where they were convicted and sentenced. Such practices appear to be
widespread and are increasingly employed as states have seen their
corrections budget increase by nearly four-fold in the past two

210. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 502 (2011).
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decades.211 In some instances, prisoners are being housed 1,000–3,000
miles away from their home state.
We suggest that corrections authorities be provided with the
autonomy to shop for jail beds with price as a relevant consideration.
This will open up a robust market for prison spots and areas currently
suffering from economic deprivation will be able to compete for jail
provisions. Indeed, there is evidence that officials make good choices
when provided with some autonomy, ultimately increasing net social
welfare. For instance, in Washington State, because of incentives
provided by the payment system and a budget deficit, the News Tribune
documents:
Tacoma pays Fife $65 per day for each inmate, plus a $20 booking
fee. Fife sends some of those inmates to Yakima, and pays $52.75 a
day to house them, with no booking fee (because booking has
already taken place). Thus, for each Tacoma inmate, Fife gains
$12.25 in profit per day. Yakima picks up the cost of transporting
inmates. Fife’s contracts with other jails show similar profit
margins.212

The legal regime for interstate transfers is provided primarily by the
National Interstate Compact for Corrections, the New England
Corrections Compact, and the Western Corrections Compact. California
had more than 8,300 of its prison inmates in facilities in Arizona,
Mississippi, and Oklahoma at the end of 2013.213 Following the 2011
Supreme Court ruling that overcrowded prison conditions were in
violation of the Eighth Amendment,214 California had little choice but to
seek the transfer of some prisoners out of state. However, this policy
seems to have run into trouble with the court directing the state to not
enter into any more contracts with private providers to transfer prisoners

211. VERA INSTITUTE, The Price of Prisons What Incarceration Costs Taxpayers (2012):
https://www.vera.org/publications/the-price-of-prisons-what-incarceration-costs-taxpayers
[https://perma.cc/5GJX-DWV4].The Idaho Department of Correction is housing prisoners at the Kit
Carson Correctional Center in Colorado; Hawaii is housing prisoners in Eloy and Florence in
Arizona, some 3,000 miles away. Vermont houses prisoners in Florence, Arizona, some 2,500 miles
away. Holy Kilby, Locked up and Shipped Away: Interstate Prisoner Transfers and the Private
Prison Industry, GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP (Nov. 18, 2013), http://grassrootsleadership.org/lockedup-and-shipped-away [https://perma.cc/4TE9-NDZZ].
212. Sean Robinson, Washington State Counties, Cities Compete for Cheaper Jail Beds,
TACOMA NEWS TRIBUNE (Nov. 12, 2013 6:03 AM), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/politicsgovernment/article24758833.html [https://perma.cc/SS3C-5QVC].
213. Victoria Law, California Ships Prisoners Out of State to “Reduce” Its Prison Population,
TRUTH-OUT.ORG (July 8, 2016, 10:02 AM), http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/20405-californiaships-prisoners-out-of-state-to-reduce-its-prison-population [https://perma.cc/3VRU-S27Y].
214. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
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out of state.215 Judicial interference in transfers is largely unnecessary as
long as strict criteria are followed.
Transfers should ideally be voluntary. In situations where inmates
decline to be transferred, the jail authorities should be able to effect
transfer subject to the fulfilment of clear criteria. The Emergency
Proclamation issued in California in 2006 offers a good guideline for
involuntary transfers.216 It provided that inmates who satisfied the
following requirements would receive priority in transfer decisions:
1. Inmates who: (a) have been previously deported by the federal
government and are criminal aliens subject to immediate
deportation; or (b) have committed an aggravated felony as defined
by federal statute and are subject to deportation.
2. Inmates who are paroling outside of California.
3. Inmates who have limited or no family or supportive ties in
California based on visitation records and/or other information
deemed relevant and appropriate by the CDCR Secretary.
4. Inmates who have family or supportive ties in a transfer state.
5. Other inmates as deemed appropriate by the CDCR Secretary.217

We advocate for the employment of such criteria by prison officials
in selecting prisoners for transfers to out of state locations.
Aside from the in-country relocation of prisoners, there have been
proposals in the U.S. to situate prisons in cheaper locations abroad. For
instance, when Arnold Schwarzenegger was Governor of California, he
vetoed a proposal to locate prisons in Mexico to house illegal
immigrants.218 He is quoted to have said:
California give [sic] Mexico the money . . . We pay them to build a
prison down in Mexico and then we have those undocumented
immigrants be down there in a prison and with their prison guards
and all this. It will halve the costs to build the prisons and halve the

215. Id. See also California May Have to Export 4,000 Inmates If Feds Don’t Postpone
Population Cap, CBS L.A. (Jan 8, 2014, 5:05 PM), http://losangeles.cbslocal.com/
2014/01/08/california-may-have-to-export-4000-inmates-if-feds-dont-postpone-population-cap/
[https://perma.cc/99GS-G55R].
216. CA Executive Proclamation, Prison Crowding State of Emergency Proclamation (Oct. 6,
2006), http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=4278 [https://perma.cc/8ZQQ-GEQU].
217. Id.
218. Mary L. Carnevale & Jim Carlton, Schwarzenegger’s Novel Spending Cut: Send Inmates
South, WALL ST. J.: WASH. WIRE (Jan. 27, 2010, 7:30 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire
/2010/01/27/schwarzeneggers-novel-spending-cut-send-inmates-south/
[https://permacc/WA2SULCR].
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costs to run the prisons. That is money—again, a billion dollars
right there—that can go into higher education.219

This proposal is not as novel as it was made out to be. In 1997, the
Correctional Services Corporation proposed, with the support of the
governor of Arizona and other officials, to build a prison in Mexico to
house 1,600 of Arizona’s illegal immigrant offenders.220 There may be
good policy reasons, in addition to financial exigency for transferring
immigrant offenders to their home states. For instance, there are
language and cultural factors that might make the period of incarceration
in the home state preferable to serving time in the U.S. In turn, this might
translate into rehabilitation of the offender. This thinking is embodied in
international instruments on the transfer of prisoners. For instance,
paragraph 1 of the United Nations Model Agreement states:
The social resettlement of offenders should be promoted by
facilitating the return of persons convicted of crime abroad to their
country of nationality or of residence to serve their sentence at the
earliest possible stage. In accordance with the above, States should
afford each other the widest measure of cooperation.221

Similarly, the Inter-American Convention on Serving Criminal
Sentences Abroad notes in the preamble that “it is advisable that the
sentenced person be given an opportunity to serve the sentence in the
country of which the sentenced person is a national.”222
Although not common, there are instances of nations entering into
agreements for the transfer of prisoners for financial reasons. Belgium
and the Netherlands entered into a convention on October 31, 2009, in
order to establish a prison in the Netherlands for the execution of
criminal sentences imposed in Belgium under Belgian law.223 The
219. Id.
220. Correctional
Services
Corporation
History,
FUNDINGUNIVERSE.COM,
http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/correctional-services-corporation-history
[https://perma.cc/Z4LF-MG68]; see also James Brooke, With Jail Costs Rising, Arizona Wants to
Build Private Prison in Mexico, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/
1997/04/20/us/with-jail-costs-rising-arizona-wants-to-build-private-prison-in-mexico.html.
221. United Nations Seventh Crime Congress, Milan, It., Aug.26–Sept. 6, 1985, UN Model
Agreement on the Transfer of Foreign Prisoners and Recommendations on the Treatment of Foreign
Prisoners,
http://www.prisonwatch.org/assets/un-model-agreement-on-the-transfer-of-foreignprisoners-and-recommendations-on-the-treatment-of-foreign-prisoners.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7DG4P4K].
222. Inter-American Convention on Serving Criminal Sentences Abroad, DEP’T OF INT’L L.,
AOS, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-57.html [https://perma.cc/7PS3-QCSW]. The
convention has eighteen ratifications/accessions.
223. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, REPORT TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF BELGIUM AND THE
NETHERLANDS ON THE VISIT TO TILBURG PRISON CARRIED OUT BY THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR
THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE AND INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT (CPT)
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agreement entered into force in February 2010 and was originally for a
duration of three years. It is supplemented by an agreement for
cooperation between the two countries, providing the nuts and bolts of
the operation of the prison in relation to the transferred prisoners.
Belgium sought to renew the convention for another year following its
successful implementation.224 The incentives for the Dutch are clear:
With falling prison populations, there are pressures to close jails with
negative consequences for those employed in such facilities.225 For
instance, the Tilburg facility which houses more than 650 inmates
pursuant to the agreement with Belgium employs 481 people, and the
convention appears to have saved some of these jobs because of the new
rental income of over $38 million.226
Several aspects of the Belgium–Netherlands convention are
noteworthy. First, transfers to the Netherlands are not voluntary, and
there is no requirement for the prisoner to consent to being moved.227 In
fact, “most of the prisoners had been notified in the morning or the night
before their transfer, except in a few cases when they had been informed
two or three days previously.”228 When the European Committee for the
Prevention of Torture visited the prison there were a total of 675 inmates,
of whom 40% were Belgian nationals; 353 out of the 390 foreign
nationals were not legal Belgian residents.229 Although there were no
allegations of ill treatment against the Dutch prison officials, inmates did
experience materially different conditions in a number of respects. Their
food provisions were different (frozen food instead of food cooked
there); rehabilitation, vocational, cultural, and recreational opportunities
were limited; and wages were lower by a third compared to Belgium
because of fewer working hours. There were differences in terms of the
force used and the disciplinary sanctions employed as well: while pepper
spray was not legal in Belgium, it could be used in the Netherlands.
Disciplinary proceedings against prisoners encountered language
problems, and French-speaking prisoners did not appear to comprehend
FROM 17 TO 19 OCTOBER 2011 7 (2012), http://www.cpt.coe.int/documents/bel/2012-19-inf-eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4MPC-ZWRA] [hereinafter CPT REPORT].
224. Id.
225. Sammy Said, Netherlands Shuts Down Prisons Due to Lack of Criminals, RICHEST (July
9, 2013), http://www.therichest.com/expensive-lifestyle/location/netherlands-shuts-down-prisonsdue-to-lack-of-criminals/ [https://perma.cc/4T4A-D8UL] (noting that 1,200 jobs were cut in 2009
due to the closure of 8 prisons).
226. State Secretary Teeven Wants to Lease Tilburg Prison to Belgium for Longer, GOV. OF
THE NETH. (Dec. 27, 2012, 11:43), http://www.government.nl/news/2012/07/27/state-secretaryteeven-wants-to-lease-tilburg-prison-to-belgium-for-longer.html [https://perma.cc/JB9Z-43LQ].
227. Id.
228. CPT REPORT, supra note 223, at 10.
229. Id. at 11.
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the proceedings or their appeal rights.230 Importantly, despite the lack of
consent at the time of transfer, most prisoners wanted to remain there.231
Following this example, Norway is reportedly in talks to lease
space in the Netherlands to house its prisoners in that country.232 The two
countries are considering a treaty whereby the prisoners would serve
time in the Netherlands under Norwegian law and would not be released
into that country upon the end of their jail terms. Financial imperatives
are again driving the agreement: in the words of the Norwegian Justice
Minister, “The situation is urgent, and we must consider short-term
measures. Leasing prison capacity abroad may contribute to alleviating
the situation. That is why we have started talks with the Netherlands.”233
On the other side, the Dutch view the agreement as an economic
opportunity beneficial to their citizens. The justice minister has said that
taking on the Norwegian prisoners would result in 700 jobs being
saved.234
In the U.K., where an average prisoner costs about £40,000 per
year, there is a considerable effort to send foreign prisoners to their
country of origin even against their consent because imprisoning the
10,600 foreigners is costing the state more than £400 million.235 The
Prime Minister has spoken out publicly in this regard.236 He recently
stated that “[the U.K. would be] using all of the influence we have to
sign prisoner transfer agreements with those countries. Even if necessary
rankly helping them to build prisons in their own country so we can

230. Id.
231. Id. at 15.
232. The Netherlands Is Turning Its Empty Prison Cells into an Export Industry, BUS. INSIDER
AUSTRALIA (Sept. 10, 2014, 3:43 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com.au/r-norway-to-rent-dutchprisons-to-cut-convict-queue-2014-9 [https://perma.cc/DTR6-JDK9 ] (quoting the Dutch state
secretary with responsibility for prisons, Fred Teeven, stating, “In Norway there is a capacity
shortage, and right now we have a surplus”).
233. Norway to ‘Export’ Inmates to Dutch Jails to Cut Queues, BBC NEWS (Sept. 9, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29123468 [https://perma.cc/XG7S-A3RN].
234. Bruno Waterfield, Holland Rents Out Empty Jail Cells to Ease Overcrowded Jails,
TELEGRAPH
(Sept.
9,
2014,
6:41
PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/worldnews/europe/netherlands/11085575/Holland-rents-out-empty-jail-cells-to-easeovercrowded-jails.html [https://perma.cc/J9L6-KUBL].
235. Sian Boyle, Jamaica Snubs Prisoner Transfer Deal: Hundreds to Stay in UK Costing
Taxpayer £27million Per Year After Their Government Refuses to Take Them Back, DAILY MAIL
(Apr. 1, 2014, 7:50 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2594776/Jamaica-snubs-prisonertransfer-deal-Hundreds-stay-UK-costing-taxpayer-27million-year-government-refuses-back.html.
236. James Chapman, Thousands of Foreign Convicts Will Be Sent Home: Cameron Vows to
Stop Overseas Inmates Clogging Jails, DAILY MAIL (Nov. 8, 2010, 2:11 AM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1327586/Foreign-convicts-sent-home-stop-overseasinmates-clogging-jails.html.
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send the prisoners home.”237 The justice secretary reportedly wants more
than 20,000 prisoners to work like regular employees within ten years in
an effort to boost prison income to £130 million a year by 2021.238
There are legitimate questions to be raised about the legality of
involuntary transfers. In the U.S., the Supreme Court ruled in
Olim v. Wakinekona that “[j]ust as an inmate has no justifiable
expectation that he will be incarcerated in any particular prison within a
State, he has no justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated in any
particular State.”239 The case involved the transfer of a prisoner from
Hawaii to California, and the Court went on to say that because of
overcrowding, “[s]tatutes and interstate agreements recognize that, from
time to time, it is necessary to transfer inmates to prisons in other
States.”240 In Burke v. Romine, the Third Circuit Court held that “the
transfer of a prisoner for reasons related to a legitimate penological
interest is a matter within the discretion of the prison authorities. Burke
has no constitutional basis on which to ground his lawsuit.”241 If such
transfers between states at significant distances to each other have been
recognized to be legal, we posit that international agreements to house
prisoners abroad may also be legal, provided basic human rights
standards are adhered to. The agreements might incorporate monitoring
237. Jack Doyle, UK to Pay for Foreign Jails in a Bid to Repatriate More Prisoners, DAILY
MAIL (Apr. 26, 2013, 6:07 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2315548/UK-pay-foreignjails-bid-repatriate-prisoners.html (noting that the foreign inmate population was topped by the
Jamaicans, Polish, Irish, and Nigerians—in that order).
238. Oliver Wright, Plan for Cheap Prison Work ‘May Cost Thousands of Jobs’,
INDEPENDENT (June 4 2012), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/plan-for-cheap-prisonwork-may-cost-thousands-of-jobs-7815140.html [https://perma.cc/2UFY-7G54]. The article notes
that prisoners are paid less than £2 per hour for the work. Cost considerations have also operated to
facilitate international agreements for the transfer and housing of prisoners in unusual contexts. For
instance, during the height of the piracy menace in 2008–2010, states most affected by pirate attacks
against ships transiting the Horn of Africa were wealthy EU countries and the U.S. Although piracy
is an international crime, and any state capturing pirates is entitled to prosecute and punish them,
these states were concerned both about the cost of prosecution and imprisonment and outsourced the
job to cheaper locations like Kenya and the Seychelles. While there were predictable concerns raised
about the human rights of captured pirates and the poor prison conditions in Kenya, the approach
adopted by the EU appears to be working. Given that the pirates are Somalis, there have been
agreements between that country and the Seychelles to transfer prisoners to their country of origin to
serve time there. See Counter-Piracy Programme, Support to the Trial and Related Treatment of
Piracy Suspects, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUG AND CRIMES, 8 Counter-Piracy Programme
(2012); Counter-Piracy Programme, Support to the Trial and Related Treatment of Piracy Suspects,
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUG AND CRIMES, 6 Counter-Piracy Programme (2011);
Counter-Piracy Programme, Support to the Trial and Related Treatment of Piracy Suspects, UNITED
NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUG AND CRIMES, 5 Counter-Piracy Programme (2011). Therefore, these
arrangements show that offshoring prisoners based on financial exigencies are viable and consistent
with precedent.
239. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (2003).
240. Id. at 246.
241. Burke v. Romine, 85 F. App’x 274, 277 (3d Cir. 2003), 2003 WL 23173709 No. 01–2569.
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provisions and require periodic inspections by U.S. prison officials to
ensure compliance with standards. If our proposal is adopted, states with
high average costs per prisoner, like New York and California, will save
billions of dollars by offshoring prisoners to cheaper locations. The
money saved could then be invested in more beneficial social projects,
such as education and infrastructure.
A corollary consequence of the impetus to locate prisons in
countries offering comparative advantages in terms of price might be the
reduction of prison costs at home. Evidence from countries that engaged
in bidding and contracting with private prison providers shows that the
public prisons became more efficient as a result of the resultant
benchmarking with the private sector.242
To be sure, several objections can be raised against our model for
housing offenders in prisons located in cheaper countries. First,
transferring offenders to facilities in other countries separates them from
their families and local communities. This imposes expenses upon family
members who might wish to visit their relatives in jail. For instance, even
if a prisoner is moved from California to Mexico, a family member
might have to spend more than $1,000 in order to visit him in jail.243 This
is likely to be a prohibitive expense for many families with the result that
the number of overall visitations might decline, which could contribute
to the isolation of the prisoner from the few potentially positive
relationships he might actually possess. In turn, this has collateral
consequences including depression for both innocent family members
and prisoners.
Nevertheless, this concern does not necessarily apply in every
situation, and many prisoners may not have familial connections with an
interest in regular visits. The precise nature of the family relationship
may also have to be assessed. If the prisoner is single and does not have
any dependents, the transfer decision might be straightforward. A
prisoner with a spouse might be in a different position to one with just a
parent or distant family member. Similarly, prisoners with adult children
who are living separately are in a different position than those with minor
242. Will Tanner, The Case for Private Prisons, in REFORM IDEAS NO. 2 1–27 (2013),
http://www.reform.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Reform_Ideas_No_2_-_The_case_for_private_
prisons.pdf; Nehal Panchamia, Competition for Prisons, 2012 INST. FOR GOV’T (2012),
http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/Prisons%20briefing%20fin
al.pdf [https://perma.cc/9E35-ZXD4].
243. An article on Salon.com quotes Danielle Rigney, the mother of a California prisoner who
was transferred to a jail in Arizona: “because he is 15 hours away, each trip costs close to
$1,000 . . . his father hasn’t been able to visit.” See Josh Eidelson, Humans Shipped Across the
Country: How America Exports Inmates to Private Prisons, SALON NEWS (Nov 22, 2013 05:29
AM),
http://www.salon.com/2013/11/22/humans_shipped_across_the_country_how_america_
exports_inmates_to_private_prisons/ [https://perma.cc/R559-ZVVD].
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children who were living with the prisoner. Therefore, a case-by-case
approach to transferring prisoners to cheaper jails could alleviate these
problems. Indeed the Inter-American convention suggests this approach
in Article V:
In taking a decision on the transfer of a sentenced person, the states
parties may consider, among other factors . . . the state of health of
the sentenced person; and the family, social, or other ties the
sentenced person may have in the sentencing state and the receiving
state.244

Further, visitation does not necessarily have to be in the flesh. With
the advances in video conferencing and internet chatting, offshore
prisons can be required to provide these facilities to an adequate level in
order to meet visitation needs of prisoners with families. It is common
for family members to interact with each other via such technology in
contemporary society because of work and other reasons for living at a
distance, and prisoners need not be an exception. Moreover, there is no
reason in principle that prisoners cannot be provided with internet access.
Of course, there is a risk that they could abuse this, for example, by
contacting past victims; however, it is possible to monitor every activity
and communication undertaken by an individual on the internet. Thus,
this risk for abusing this facility can be significantly curtailed. Internet
access by prisoners would enable them to have regular and extensive
communication with relatives and friends, but it would also enable
prisoners to stay informed of changes to the communities they will enter
upon release.245 Thus, objections relating to distancing prisoners and
relatives are not overwhelming.
A second objection would likely be that prison conditions in other
countries might vastly differ from our own and pose adverse human
rights consequences for prisoners. Jails in cheaper, third-world countries
might be over-crowded, unhygienic, prone to violence from other
inmates and guards, and corrupt. In addition, these jails might suffer
from poor health care facilities and low investments in rehabilitation opportunities. However, these issues can be addressed by including
minimum requirements in the inter-state agreement.
The Inter-American convention states in Article VII(2) that “the
sentence of a sentenced person who is transferred shall be served in
accordance with the laws and procedures of the receiving state, including
244. Inter-American Convention on Serving Criminal Sentences Abroad, supra note 222.
245. This issue of prisoner Internet access is dealt with at length in Mirko Bagaric et al., The
Hardship That Is Internet Deprivation and What It Means for Sentencing: Development of the
Internet Sanction and Connectivity for Prisoners, 51 AKRON L. REV. (forthcoming).
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application of any provisions relating to reduction of time of
imprisonment or of alternative service of the sentence.” The Convention
Against Torture might also come into play where there is a record of
torture in a state’s prisons. Specifically, Article III states that no party
“shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another State
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in
danger of being subjected to torture.”246 In determining whether there are
substantial grounds warranting such a belief, the state “shall take into
account all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the
existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant
or mass violations of human rights.”247 These requirements would ensure
that prisoners in another country are treated humanely and not sent to
prisons with a history of torture or inhumane treatment. Further, ongoing
monitoring of the conditions in the prisons would reduce the likelihood
of prisoners being subjected to unacceptable conditions.
Lastly, critics may claim that transferring prisoners to offshore
locations might impinge on a prisoner’s right to counsel and legal
representation. In addition to physical distance as a prohibitive factor in
maintaining contact with existing legal representation, those who might
need a lawyer to pursue legal recourse while in jail will not have easy
access to trained lawyers because the legal system is likely to be different
in another jurisdiction. While this poses challenges, the offshore prison
can be required to provide video conferencing facilities and a list of U.S.
lawyers who can be accessed by prisoners in a confidential environment.
For instance, a room with privacy that can be booked by a prisoner might
satisfy the requirement of providing access to counsel.
Thus, there are considerable financial savings that could be made if
correction authorities had greater capacity to house prisoners in the most
cost-effective locations. Moreover, potential risks associated with this are
foreseeable and, with sensible planning, can be mitigated.
CONCLUSION
Punishment is an essential part of the criminal justice system. Many
offenders are deserving of severe punishment. The reflex that criminals
deserve to be punished and imprisoned is understandable. What is
unjustifiable is the massive increase in prison numbers over the past few
decades. This growth in the prison industry has occurred, but it has not
been planned nor has it been deliberate.
246. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46, at Article 2 (Dec. 10, 1984), http://www.un.org/documents/
ga/res/39/a39r046.htm [https://perma.cc/G2RQ-D8TF].
247. Id. at Article 3(2).
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The massive expenditure on prisons requires a strategic and
forensic analysis about the nature of criminal punishment and the most
efficient and effective means to achieve attainable and appropriate
objectives of sentencing. This Article has undertaken such an analysis.
Most offenders who are currently imprisoned should be punished
through other forms of sanctions. The new sanctions come in two main
forms: employment/education and monitoring. The employment and
education sanctions have been developed against the backdrop of a
theoretical examination of the nature of criminal punishment: the
interests that individuals covet and the principle of proportionality. The
monitoring sanction invokes new technology to provide a more effective
solution to the centuries-old problem of finding an effective means to
punish serious offenders while ensuring they do not reoffend.
The implementation of both of these sanctions could reduce prison
numbers in the United States by more than two-thirds. This would result
in massive public revenue savings, while increasing the fairness and
effectiveness of the criminal justice system. A resistance to the
development of these new sanctions and retention of the status quo
regarding the use of imprisonment would constitute a grievously
misplaced political decision.
However, the criminal justice system does not have a proud history
of being driven by evidence-based practices. In this realm, expediency,
most typically manifesting in the “tough on crime” mantra, is the
pervasive ideology. Our represented political representatives owe it to
the community to minimise the cost of mass incarceration and consider
offshoring and outsourcing. Under our proposals, prison officials would
adopt a case-by-case analysis to transfer prisoners to locations in cheaper
states or developing countries. This would drastically reduce prison
costs, providing governments with funds to redress shortcomings in
important social services, such as health and education. It is to be
emphasised, however, that this proposal is a fallback position to the most
desirable solution to reducing the cost of imprisonment—reducing prison
numbers—and it is hoped that the reforms proposed in this Article will
assist in achieving this outcome.

